The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water by Dellapenna, Joseph W.
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 4
The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myth of Markets for Water
Joseph W. Dellapenna
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 Wm.
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 317 (2000), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol25/iss2/4
THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING NAMES RIGHT:
THE MYTH OF MARKETS FOR WATER
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA*
If names are not correct, then language is not in accord with the truth of
things. If language is not in accord with the truth of things, then affairs
cannot be carried out successfully.
-Confucius
I. Do NAMES MATTER?
Confucius was onto something 2-- even if his point that using
names correctly is central to a successful ordering of society is not self-
evident to many speaking and writing today. The practice of getting
names right is particularly important in the legal profession for we are, in
fact, in a line of work that all too often richly rewards members of the pro-
fession who succeed in obfuscating names and meanings.3 Increasingly,
the leading members of the legal profession, however, have come to em-
brace the idea that speaking and writing clearly-which, among other
things, includes getting names right-is essential not only to the success-
" Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.B.A., University of Michigan (1965); J.D.,
Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International & Comparative Law,
George Washington University (1969); LL.M. (Environmental Law), Columbia Univer-
sity (1974).
1 CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS 1 (ca. 450 BCE) (author's translation).
2 See generally Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the "Rectification of
Names" in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19 (1996); Jerry J. Phillips, Commen-
tary on the Foibles of the English Language, 66 TENN. L. REV. 789 (1999); K.M. Sharma,
What's in a Name?: Law, Religion, and Islamic Names, 26 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 151
(1998).
3 See, e.g., RONALD L. GOLDFARB & JAMES C. RAYMOND, CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS: A
GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING 3-20 (1982); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
290-98 (1963). Of course, the same phenomenon is found in some other professions as
well. See, e.g., George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS 156 (Sonia Brownell Orwell ed., 1953).
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ful ordering of society, but also to the successful practice of law." Hence
the emergence and eventual dominance of the plain English movement in
the contemporary practice of law.5
In this article, I address one particular name much in vogue around
the globe since the end of communism and the virtual demise of social-
ism-the word "market."6 I address the use of this word as applied to a
4 See, e.g., GOLDFARB & RAYMOND, supra note 3; DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING:
SENSE & NONSENSE (1982).
5 See, e.g., CARL FELSENFELD & ALAN SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH
(1981) (advocating the use of plain, understandable English to increase consumer protec-
tion and communication).
6 There is a large body of literature on the transition from command to market econo-
mies. See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN ET AL., THE MARKET MEETS ITS MATCH:
RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIES OF EASTERN EUROPE (1994); DIETER BOs,
PRIVATIZATION: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT (1991); THE ECONOMICS OF
TRANSFORMATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW MARKET ECONOMIES (Alfred
Schipke & Alan Taylor eds., 1994); FROM SOCIALISM TO MARKET ECONOMY: THE
TRANSITION PROBLEM (William S. Kern ed., 1992); A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION,
PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES (Gregory S. Alexander
& Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994); ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDREJ RAPACZYNSKI,
PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? (1994);
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY
REFORM, PRIVATISATION AND COMPETITION POLICY (1992); PRIVATIZATION AND
DEREGULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Dennis J. Gayle & Jonathan N. Goodrich eds.,
1990); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1991); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
THE MARKETPLACE THAT Is REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998); Richard J. Arne-
son, Is Socialism Dead? A Comment on Market Socialism and Basic Income Capitalism,
102 ETHICS 485 (1992); Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The
Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1995); Matthew J. Hagopian, The Engines of Privatization: Investment Funds and Fund
Legislation in Privatizing Economies, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 75 (1994); Andrew
Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securi-
ties Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62 (1993); Klaus M.
Schmidt, The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach, 12
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1996); Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatiza-
tion: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23 (1992); Karla W. Simon, Pri-
vatization of Social and Cultural Services in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative
Experiences, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 383 (1995); Symposium, A Recipe for Effecting Institu-
tional Changes to Achieve Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 295-465 (1995); Kim Reis-
man, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S349 (1992).
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particular context-namely the now fashionable claim that markets for
water will provide a nearly painless means for resolving problems of water
allocation, distribution, and preservation.' What I find most alarming
7 Many authors have analyzed or advocated a shift to a privatized water markets. See,
e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP (1997); HARALD FREDERIKSEN ET AL., WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT IN ASIA (World Bank Tech. Pap. no. 212, 1993); DIANA C. GIBBONS, THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER (1986); CLAY J. LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH
WATER MARKETS (1998); BONNIE SALIBA & DAVID BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1987);
RODNEY SMITH, TRADING WATER: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER
MARKETING (1988) [hereinafter SMITH, TRADING WATER]; WATER MARKETING-THE
NEXT GENERATION (Terry L. Anderson & Peter Hill eds., 1997); WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT: A WORLD BANK POLICY PAPER (1994) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT); WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS]; Nir
Becker & Naomi Zeitouni, A Market Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Water Dispute,
23 WATER INT'L 238 (1998); H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water Law, Water
Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J.L. & ECON. 111 (1980);
Chan Chang & Ronald C. Griffin, Water Marketing as a Reallocative Institution in
Texas, 28 WATER RESOURCES RES. 879 (1992); Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of
Water Law-State Law and Water Market Development in the Southwest, 28 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 721 (1988); James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use and the Pro-
tection of Vested Rights: A Challenge for Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 503
(1998); James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of
Water Transfer Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L.
225 (1996); Ariel Dinar & J. Letey, Agricultural Water Marketing, Allocative Efficiency,
and Drainage Reduction, 20 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 210 (1991); Andrew K. Dragun
& Victor Gleeson, From Water Law to Transferability in New South Wales, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 645 (1989); Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water
Policy: Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 165 (1998); Brian E.
Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1994); Ronald
C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu, Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform, 32
NAT. RESOURCES J. 265 (1992); Ronald C. Griffin & Shih-Hsun Hsu, The Potential for
Water Market Efficiency when Instream Flows Have Value, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 292
(1993); Ray Huffaker et al., Institutional Feasibility of Contingent Water Marketing to
Increase Migratory Flows for Salmon on the Upper Snake River, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
671 (1993); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implica-
tions for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 21-29 (1995); Ronald A. Kaiser,
Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 181 (1996); Ronald A. Kaiser & Laura M. Phillips, Dividing the
Waters: Water Marketing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in the Edwards Aquifer Re-
gion, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 411 (1998); Ari Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional,
and Structural Characteristics of an Active Water Market, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL.
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about this fashion is the misuse of the name market-at least as I under-
stand that word.
I, of course, understand that water in relatively small quantities can
easily be bought or sold. I myself have bought bottled water in markets in
many parts of the world. What I am concerned about-as are those who
advocate markets as water management tools-is raw water in bulk, such
as rivers, lakes, aquifers, and the like. In this article, I shall explore the
reasons why markets have not worked, and will not work, for raw water.
In so doing, I shall consider how the question has been rendered more dif-
ficult to assess by misuse of the name "market" to describe certain situa-
tions that simply are not markets.
Before I begin, however, I also want to make clear that I am not
opposed to markets on principle. I have lived in a communist command
economy for a year-in a remote comer of the People's Republic of
China-without the protections from local conditions that even then for-
eigners living in large cities like Beijing, Guangzhou, or Shanghai could
expect! As a result, I know first hand what the most likely alternative to a
971 (1994); Gabriel Roth, The Role of the Private Sector in Providing Water in Devel-
oping Countries, 9 NAT. RESOURCES F. 167 (1985); Mohammad Shatanawi & Odeh al-
Jayousi, Evaluating Market-Oriented Water Policies in Jordan: A Comparative Study, 20
WATER INT'L 88 (1995); Hillel I. Shuval, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts
between Israel and Her Neighbors-A Regional Water-for-Peace Plan, 17 WATER INT'L
133 (1992); Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Management: Three Case
Studies and a "Market" Approach, 16 ENVTL. L. 797 (1986) [hereinafter Smith,
Groundwater Management]; Jack Steme, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects
for Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203 (1997); David
Sunding et al., Water Markets and the Cost of Improving Water Quality in the San Fran-
cisco Bay/Delta Estuary, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 159 (1995); Sym-
posium, The Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 1 (1996); Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical
Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3 (1996); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv. 673 (1993); Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, Water
Marketing and Instream Flows.' The Next Step in Protecting California's Instream Val-
ues, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 132 (1990); Hisham Zarour & Jad Isaac, Nature's Apportion-
ment and the Open Market: A Promising Solution to the Arab-Israeli Water Conflict, 18
WATER INT'L 40 (1993); Alison Mylander Gregory, Comment, Groundwater and Its
Future: Competing Interests and Burgeoning Markets, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 229 (1992);
Lee Herold Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consis-
tent with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REv. 179 (1988).
8 Just for the record, I was a Fulbright Professor of Law at Jilin University, in Chang-
chun, China, in 1987-1988. Changchun is in the center of Manchuria and is the capital of
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market economy actually would be like-and I fully appreciate the many
virtues of a market economy. My concern in this paper is more narrow
than questions about the utilities of markets generally. Simply put, it is
that, all too often, the proponents of markets as water management tools
confuse the administrative use of economic incentives for markets.9 The
following example will perhaps make the point clear.
Bolivia is one of the poorer nations on the planet. Like many poor
nations, it has had trouble providing water to its cities, industries, and
farmers. In an effort to deal with the problem, the Bolivian government
recently proposed to privatize the delivery of water, beginning in the city
of Cochabamba, the country's third largest city' 0 The plan involved the
construction of a new electricity and drinking water network by a consor-
tium of American, Bolivian, British, Italian, and Spanish companies at a
cost of $200 million. The project promised more reliable delivery of pota-
ble water, but would raise the cost of the water to the residents of the city
and the surrounding countryside by 35 percent. The plan provoked such
widespread public opposition-including roadblocks across highways in
widely scattered regions and violent protests in which people on both sides
died-that the consortium cancelled its project rather than attempt to force
it through in the face of such widespread opposition.
Now, I am the first to acknowledge that the project might very well
have been the best possible solution to the pressing needs for a safer and
more certain water supply for Cochabamba." Places in the world where
Jilin Province. Jilin Province at the time had less than 200 foreigners living there in the
midst of a Chinese population of around 23,000,000.
9 See generally David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Pro-
gram?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 289 (1998) (suggesting more economic incentive programs to increase
innovation and continuous improvement in emissions trading).
10 Bolivian Water Plan Dropped after Protests Turn into Melees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2000, at A12.
1 For sources regarding the consequences, difficulties, and benefits of privatizing mar-
kets for environmental resources, see generally ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 1996)
[hereinafter ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS]; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: How TO APPLY
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS (1991) [hereinafter OECD]; Leigh Hancher, Privatization of
Drinking Water in Europe, in THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY
RESPONSES 277 (Edward H.P. Brans et al. eds., 1997); Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water
Infrastructure to Developing Countries via Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO.
20001
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water delivery facilities do not recover their costs from their customers are
places where water delivery facilities are underfunded, unreliable, and
generally decrepit. The city of Amman, the capital of Jordan, provides an
excellent example. There water is pumped for domestic uses only one day
per week, and the shortfall for domestic needs has been estimated as high
as 50 percent. 2 Furthermore, making water users pay at least the cost of
processing and delivering water is the easiest way, perhaps the only way,
to make individual water users consider the worth of the use relative to the
cost of using the water. Only if they consider the cost of the water usage
will individual water users make rational decisions regarding whether and
how to use water.
My problem is that the Bolivian proposal is very unlikely to pro-
duce anything like a real market-that is, a setting where water users will
be able to negotiate over the price of water and seek out the least cost pro-
vider, providers will be able to seek out the user willing to pay the highest
price, and both will otherwise engage in the sorts of activities that give rise
to the expectation that markets are likely to generate the "highest and best"
or at least the most economically efficient use of water.'3 The price of
water in Cochabamba almost certainly would be set by the consortium,
with governmental regulation hardly mattering. The result is that who re-
INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 91 (1995); Monica Maldonado, Public Water in Private Hands,
Civ. ENGINEERING, Jan. 1997, at 49; Peter Passell, A Gush of Profits from Water Sale?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at DI; Andrew Pollack, Tightening the Faucet: How U.S.
Filter Is Consolidating the Waterworks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at DI; Roth, supra
note 7.
12 See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER AND THE QUEST
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 175 (1994); NURIT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 230 (1994); Radwan AI-Mubarak AI-Weshah, Jordan's
Water Resources: Technical Perspective, 17 WATER INT'L 124, 128 (1992); Manuel
Schiffler, Sustainable Development of Water Resources in Jordan: Ecological and Eco-
nomic Aspects in a Long-Term Perspective, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL,
POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS 239, 245-47 (J.A. Allan & Chibli Mallat
eds., 1995).
13 The classic statement, of course, comes from Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Can-
nan ed., 1937). See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 492
(1988); PAUL R. MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 28 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 1.1,
1.2 (5"' ed. 1998); Steven A. Bibas, Student Writing Competition, A Contractual Ap-
proach to Data Privacy, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1994).
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ceives water at what price and for what purposes is an administrative deci-
sion that will not result from the play of market forces.
Unfortunately, all too often economists and others will proclaim
that proposals such as the now abandoned Cochabamba plan were mar-
kets. An excellent example of such misnaming is the California Water
Bank to be discussed below. 4 Why does that matter? It matters be-
cause-particularly since the collapse of communism and socialism on a
global scale-we presume that the results reached in a market are "cor-
rect"--a presumption that we do not indulge for the outcomes of govern-
mental or other non-market decisions. 5 After all, there are serious ques-
tions about whether the experts at any administering agency ever can real-
istically be expected to acquire the necessary information to arrive at the
right conclusions. The market, on the other hand, functions like a mam-
moth computational system that translates relevant information into com-
mon factors---dollars and cents-which can then be combined to tell us
through a single figure-the price-the sum of all the variables that im-
pact upon the price. It is no wonder then that many people advocate mar-
kets not only for managing water, but for managing environmental prob-
lems generally. 6
14 See the text infra at notes 127-63.
15 For a crisp statement of the point, see Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the
Wise Administrator and the Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207 (1974).
16 Many authors have argued that private markets would produce better environmental
policies. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991); DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1991); ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? (Ridiger Wolfrum ed.,
1996); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1990); T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE
IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985); John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental
Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving Wilderness Conservation Goals?, 76 DENV. U. L. REV.
519 (1999); John R.E. Bliese, Conservative Principles and Environmental Policies, 7
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, No. 2, at 1, 23-36 (1998); Robert I. Fassbender, Reducing
Great Lakes Toxics: Can We Do More for Less through Wastewater Effluent Trading?, 1
WiS. ENVTL. L.J. 57 (1994); James L. Huffinan, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental
Protection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425 (1994); R. Prescott Jaunich, The Environment, the
Free Market, and Property Rights: Post-Lucas Privatization of the Public Trust, 15 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 167 (1994); Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of
Wildlife Institutions, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 625 (1995); Frederic C. Menz, Transborder
Emissions Trading between Canada and the United States, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803
(1995); Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Land-
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Given my experience, I fully accept that markets are the best tool
we have for managing resources when markets work reasonably well, and
therefore I fully accept the presumption that the outcome of a set of market
transactions are the best outcomes. But that presumption should not be
accorded to the outcomes of administrative events masquerading as mar-
kets. 7 Calling an administrative system a market reduces, if it does not
remove altogether, the sort of close, on-going scrutiny that the decision
properly deserves. Thus, we must be very careful to use the name "mar-
ket" accurately.
Once we begin to use the label "market" accurately in water man-
agement contexts, perhaps the most striking point that we discover is that,
as an empirical matter, actual markets in free-flowing water have always
been extremely rare. Such markets as there are generally have been used
to transfer fairly small quantities of water among similar users in close
proximity to each other, such as between farmers or ranchers within a sin-
gle irrigation or water management district. 8 The modem concern, how-
scape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459
(1999); Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's Dirtiest
Air? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District's Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995); Kurt Stephenson et al., Toward an Ef-
fective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the Statutory
and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENVTL. L. 775 (1999); Carrie A. Tipton,
Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual
Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381 (1995).
17 For sources examining the notion that markets and ownership are not always the an-
swer to resources problems, see generally Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free
Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371 (1992); John Prather Brown
& William L. Holahan, Taxes and Legal Rules for the Control of Externalities When
There Are Strategic Responses, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 165 (1980); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice
between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1989); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Construction of Ownership, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 173;
Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27 (1996)
[hereinafter Freyfogle, Common Wealth]; Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights,
12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995); Mark Kanazawa, Water Subsidies, Water
Transfers and Economic Efficiency, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 112 (1994).
18 See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94 (9' Cir. 1996), rev'g sub
nom, Westlands Water Dist. v. Patterson, 900 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The proc-
ess involved in that case is also described in Logging into Water, Civ. ENGINEERING, July
1996, at 14. See also RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 133-40 (1989); Owen L. Ander-
son & Pauline M. Simmons, Reallocation, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§
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ever, is not with creating markets to facilitate such transactions, but to find
ways to move large quantities of water out of existing uses into uses that
were not developed at the time the water was first allocated to existing
patterns of use. This generally means moving water out of agriculture in
order to meet the needs of growing cities, new industries, or newly recog-
nized environmental needs. 9 Water markets in fact have seldom been
16.04(c)(2) to 16.04(c)(5) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); Dana Sebren Cooper & D. Michael
Harvey, An Upstream Swim: The Crafting and Passage of the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 253, 258-61
(Kathleen Marion Carr & James Crammond eds., 1995) [hereinafter WATER LAW]; John
H. Davidson, Emerging Issues in Western Water Transfers, 13 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 73
(1991); Willis H. Ellis & Charles T. DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water,
57 NEB. L. REV. 333 (1978); Todd G. Glass, The 1992 Omnibus Water Act: Three Ru-
brics of Reclamation Reform, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (1995); Brian E. Gray, The Shape of
Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 HASTINGS W-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 23, 27 (1996); Brian E. Gray et al., Transfers of Federal Reclama-
tion Water: A Case Study of California's San Joaquin Valley, 21 ENVTL. L. 911 (1991);
Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for
Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439 (1986); Richard Roos-Collins, Volun-
tary Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773 (1987); Thompson, supra note 7, at 708-23.
The lower Rio Grande basin has seen the emergence of a "spot market" for wa-
ter transfers that some might think defies the statement in the text. While some of these
transactions involve very dissimilar uses, the water uses are all highly regulated, short
term, and are for relatively small quantities, and transfers do not take water out of the
basin. See David W. Yoskowitz, Spot Market for Water along the Texas Rio Grande:
Opportunities for Water Management, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345 (1999). Cf. Wir H.
Kloezen, Water Markets between Mexican Water User Associations, 1 WATER POL'Y 437
(1998) (discussing the use of water markets and trades in Mexico, specifically analyzing
the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district). See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa
A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 2
HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27, 45-46 (1994) (discussing the short-term
transfers of water that are used in the west for seasonal or temporary needs).
19 For sources discussing the increasing need to move agricultural users' water to meet
urban and municipal needs, see for example ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 7;
LANDRY, supra note 7; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); SALIBA & BUSH, supra
note 7, at 45-46; JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 217-18 (2nd ed. 1991); SMITH, TRADING WATER, supra note 7; WAHL,
supra note 18, at 140-44; RICHARD WAHL, WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST
EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 11-12 (1993); WATER SCARCITY: IMPACTS ON
WESTERN AGRICULTURE (Ernest A. Engelbert & Ann Foley Scheuring eds., 1984); Mi-
chael C. Blumm, Symposium, Seven Myths of Northwest Water Law and Associated Sto-
ries, 26 ENVTL. L. 141, 145-46 (1996); Colby, supra note 7; Corbridge, supra note 7;
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used to accomplish such significant changes in the ways in which water is
used, even when there would be clear benefits to society from the transac-
tion.2" This raises a rather interesting, if all too obvious, question: If mar-
kets in water are so good, why are they so seldom used?
Crammond, supra note 7; Dragun & Gleeson, supra note 7; Graff & Yardas, supra note
7, at 165; Gray, supra note 7; Griffin & Boadu, supra note 7; Charles W. Howe et al.,
The Economic Impacts ofAgriculture-to-Urban Water Transfers on the Area of Origin: A
Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1200
(1990); Israel & Lund, supra note 7; Kaiser, supra note 7, at 185-92; Ronald A. Kaiser &
Shane Binion, Untying the Gordian Knot: Negotiated Strategies for Protecting Instream
Flows, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157 (1998); Kaiser & Phillips, supra note 7, at 436-43;
MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18; Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The
Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1989); Sterne, supra note 7; A. Dan
Tarlock & Sarah D. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law
from Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163, 168-
69 (1999); Gregory Thomas & Tara Miller, Reflections on the "Model Water Transfer
Act" by the National Heritage Institute, 4 HASTINGS W-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 91,
99-101 (1996); Thompson, supra note 7; Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers
on Rural Areas, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13 (1990); Williams & McHugh, supra note 7;
Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few Transactions Among Water Users?, 68 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 1143 (1986); Jennifer L. Cordua, Comment, The Search for New Supplies:
Salvaging the Remains ofAgricultural Water Conservation in California, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 591 (1998); Mark W. Tader, Note, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial Use,
Property, and Politics, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 277.
20 See SMITH, TRADING WATER, supra note 7, at 28-52; WAHL, supra note 18, at 197-29;
Steven E. Clyde, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Transfers and Reallocation of Water
Resources, 29 S.D. L. Rev. 232 (1984); Colby, supra note 7; Eric T. Freyfogle, Water
Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, at 510-14; Mason Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Wa-
ter Resources Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 131 (1969); Micha Gisser & Ronald N.
Johnson, Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival of an
Agency, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 137; Zachary McCormick, Institutional Bar-
riers to Water Marketing in the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 953 (1994); Kevin
M. O'Brien, Water Marketing in Calfornia, 19 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1988); William C.
Schaab, Prior Appropriation, Impairment, Replacements, Models and Markets, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 25 (1983); Thompson, supra note 7, at 723-39; Timothy D. Tregarthen,
The Market for Property Rights in Water, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE: POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES IN A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK 139 (Ved Nanda ed., 1977); Timothy D. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado:
Fear and Loathing of the Marketplace, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 119; Frank J.
Trelease & Dellas W. Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the Transfer of Water
Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1966); Stephen F. Williams, Optimizing Water Use:
The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 301 (1973); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (casting doubt on the wisdom of reliance on the "efficient
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In this article, I shall address that last question first: Why are mar-
kets so seldom found in fact as a water management tool? In doing so, I
will demonstrate that not only have true markets for water been rare, but
that there are very good reasons why this is so. I then shall consider how
certain administrative regimes that have been misdescribed as "markets"
have functioned-principally the California Water Bank. Then I shall
close by presenting an alternative to a market regime that perhaps could
better accomplish the goals propounded by those who trumpet the virtues
of markets as water management tools.
II. WHY Do MARKETS FOR WATER FAIL?
Many of us have become so accustomed to markets in our lives
that we have lost sight of the fact that markets are not natural phenomena.
Markets are cultural artifacts created and structured by social arrangements
that we term "law."'" To understand markets, how and why they operate,
and when and how they fail, one must begin by examining the law that
structures a particular market. While many aspects of the law serve to es-
tablish and regulate markets, most fundamental to the functioning of mar-
kets are the laws that define the property rights that form the "objects" of
the market's transactions, that define the "things" that are bought or sold
in the market. We must begin then by considering the possibilities for
"owning" water.
Given the generally unquestioning acceptance of markets in the
United States, it is remarkable how, when markets for water become a
subject of public concern, the debate often becomes highly emotional,
market" hypothesis); Eric J. Tabor, Note, A Proposal for a Regulated Market of Water
Rights in Iowa, 65 IOWA L. REv. 979 (1980) (discussing types of water markets that
could be used in Iowa to protect against times of water scarcity).
21 For sources on the economic effects of social institutions, like markets, property rights,
and law, see generally ROBERT HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952); Lee Alston et al., The Determinants and Impact of
Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1996);
Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property
Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389 (1993); Paul Stanton Kibel, Reconstructing the Marketplace:
The International Timber Trade and Forest Protection, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 735
(1996). Cf Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19
STAN. L. REV. 786 (1967) (arguing that there is no inherent function in the concept of a
"court" or any other branch of government).
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with a great deal of the emotion against markets.2 2 Economists and others
who advocate the utility of markets as water management tools, on the
other hand, seldom address why markets are so rarely found or why there
is so much resistance to applying market principles to water. Rather, such
advocates are likely to denigrate critics of water markets as holding onto
cultural, religious, or even mystical notions of the importance of water,
resulting in arbitrary legal impediments to markets when water ought to be
treated like any other commodity." This attitude simply ignores the most
important features of water. First, people look upon water differently from
other resources because water is more immediately essential to life than
any other resource except air. Deprive us of air, and we die in minutes.
Deprive us of water, and we die in days. Deprive us of food, and we can
go on for weeks or months, depending on our physical condition at the be-
ginning of the fast-and on whether we have adequate supplies of water.
Finally, as a Turkish businessman once commented, "[c]ountless millions
22 For examples of opposition to water markets specifically, see Cordua, supra note 19, at
610-11; Anthony DePalma, Free Trade in Fresh Water? Canada Says No and Halts Ex-
ports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at A9; Graff& Yardas, supra note 7, at 169; Gray, su-
pra note 18, at 26; Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1
HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 51-52 (1994).
23 See Timothy D. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado: Fear and Loathing of the Market
Place, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 119 ("[A]n economist might be defined as
someone who doesn't see anything special about water."). See also ANDERSON & LEAL,
supra note 16; ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 17-29, 114-16; NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 70-84; SMITH, TRADING WATER, supra note 7, at 10-
15; WAHL, supra note 18, at 147-91; Kenneth E. Boulding, The Implications of Improved
Water Allocation Policy, in WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 299, 306 (1980); F. Lee Brown, Water Markets and Traditional
Water Values: Merging Commodity and Community Perspectives, 22 WATER INT'L 2
(1997); F. Lee Brown & Charles T. DuMars, Water Rights and Market Transfers, in
WATER SCARCITY, supra note 19, at 408, 412-13; Clyde, supra note 20; Colby, supra
note 7; Cordua, supra note 19; Dragun & Gleeson, supra note 7; Gisser & Johnson, su-
pra note 20; Graff & Yardas, supra note 7, at 169, 220-21; Gregory, supra note 7; Grif-
fin & Boadu, supra note 7; Huffaker et al., supra note 7; James Hufftnan, Instream Water
Use: Public and Private Alternatives, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 249, 268; Kai-
ser, supra note 7, at 247-50, 260; MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 52; McCormick,
supra note 20; Kathleen Miller, The Right to Use Versus the Right to Sell: Spillover Ef-
fects and Constraints on the Water Rights of Irrigation Organization Members, 23
WATER RESOURCES RES. 2166 (1987); Michelson, supra note 7; Smith, Groundwater
Management, supra note 7; Thompson, supra note 7; Williams & McHugh, supra note 7;
Young, supra note 19, at 1144-45, 1149. See also Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Federal In-
come Tax Implications of Water Transfers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1995).
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of people have lived without love, but none without water." '24 Further-
more, water is an ambient resource that by its very nature is shared among
users. Therefore, water cannot be owned in the usual sense of that word.
These two features of water make sense of the observation of Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes that "[a] river is more than an amenity, it is a
treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those
who have power over it.""5 In a sense, this article is an extended medita-
tion on Holmes' comment, seeking to explain why raw water is more than
simply a resource like other resources. In this section, I shall explore why
water is a "public good," and how because of this reality our attempts to
treat water as a form of common or private property have failed.
A. Water as a Public Good
Because of water's importance to human and other life, and be-
cause of its ambient nature, water has long been considered to be the
quintessential "public good."26 Economists are so accustomed to consid-
ering water as a paradigm of a public good that they customarily use water
metaphors to discuss public goods generally: "common pool resource,"
"spill over effects," and so on. This fact alone should be enough to give
even the most free-market oriented economists pause to consider whether
true markets will function effectively for these resources. Yet upon care-
ful consideration, water turns out not to be a public good in the narrowest
sense of that term. Only the impossibility of setting up real markets for
raw water demonstrates the wisdom of treating water as a public good.
24 Amikam Nachmani, The Politics of Water in the Middle East: The Current Situation,
Imaginary and Practical Solutions, in WATER AS AN ELEMENT OF COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 301, 302 (Ali ihsan Bagis ed., 1994)
25 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931). See also Eric T. Freyfogle, Con-
text and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1543-45
(1989) (interpreting the new California water entitlement laws).
26 See WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, supra note 7, at 81-92; John S. Harbison,
Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property Rights, Public Values, and Instream Waters, 26
LAND & WATER L. REV. 535, 546-49 (1991); Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural En-
vironments: Compensation, Market Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L.
REv. 365 (1995). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 266-74 (1971); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987).
2000] 329
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
A "public good" is one that shares two qualities: indivisibility and
publicness.27 Indivisibility means that a good cannot be divided up among
the consuming public to allow some consumers access to the resource
while excluding other potential consumers from the resource. Publicness
means that the resource is shared freely (if not equally) among the group-
consumption by one person does not, at least under most circumstances,
interfere with consumption by others. Because the good is indivisible, one
cannot simply divide it up and buy as much as one wants; because it is
public, it is impossible to keep others from accessing and enjoying the
good so long as it is accessible and enjoyable by anyone. In other words, a
public good is one that all within the relevant public must enjoy more or
less equally, or no one can enjoy the good at all.
Public goods generally are free goods as far as markets are con-
cerned because, as the definition suggests, consumers cannot (or cannot
realistically) be excluded from enjoying the good.28 How much can one
charge others for viewing the blue sky over one's property? The only
costs, if any, associated with a public good are the costs of capture, trans-
portation, and delivery, not a cost for the good itself. This gives rise to the
most important problem regarding the efficient management of public
goods. If you invest in developing or improving the good, others who in-
vest or pay nothing will enjoy the benefits of your investment because you
cannot exclude those others from enjoying the good.29 Such others are
known as "free riders" and are seen as a serious inhibition to investment
unless the government (or some other institution) takes responsibility for
assuring that all (or nearly all) in fact pay for the benefits they receive.3"
27 See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 112-13; GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999);
STEPHEN WALTERS, ENTERPRISE, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC (1993); Niva Elkin-
Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 553, 559-61 (1999); Harbison, supra note 26, at 547.
28 See generally PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
(Tyler Cowen ed., 1992); John Ledyard, Market Failure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:
ALLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS 185 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
29 See generally R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974)
(discussing the misconception of economists who use the British lighthouse system as an
example of a benefit best provided by the government).
30 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also
Mehmet Bac, Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Envi-
ronmental Resources, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 301 (1996); Amnon Rapoport, Provi-
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Air pollution is an excellent example. Automobile exhaust is a
significant source of air pollution. If many people voluntarily invest in
cleaner running cars in order to protect the air we breathe, I will have
cleaner air just as much as they will. If I decide not to buy a cleaner run-
ning car, that decision by itself will not greatly affect the quality of the air
we all breathe. I can (and many would) decide to become "free riders" on
the efforts of others to clean the air. As more people realize that this pos-
sibility exists, fewer would voluntarily buy a cleaner running car. Why
bother when my buying a cleaner running car will have little effect on air
quality and many or most others are not making the investments necessary
to improve air quality? My single decision to buy a cleaner running car
actually would have too small an effect on air quality to justify my cost if
most other people are free riding. Under these circumstances, all (or
nearly all) simply will not buy cleaner running cars voluntarily, and we
will end up with dirtier air than we would if there were no free riders. The
solution, of course, is to compel all to buy cleaner running cars. Relying
on the market simply won't work; relying on regulation will.
Water, of course, is not indivisible and public in the strictest sense,
and a few economists therefore have denied that it is a public good.3 But
few things are strictly indivisible and public, which is why economists and
philosophers often use something like nuclear deterrence as an example of
a true public good.32 What a culture treats as a public good, however, is
not determined just by its physical characteristics, but also by its social
and economic characteristics. When the costs to exclude others would be
so high that it is impractical to exclude others from access to the good, or
when there are other (perhaps cultural) reasons why a society will not ex-
clude some of its members from access to the good, the good is treated as
if it were a public good.
The most usual social or economic characteristic that leads to our
treating something as a "public good" that is not strictly indivisible or
public is that transaction costs are simply so high that no market can func-
sion of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm, 79 AM. POL. SO. REV. 148
(1985); Ramzi Suleirnan, Provision of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty: A
Theoretical Analysis, 9 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 163 (1997).
31 See, e.g., ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 113-14; Harbison, supra note 26, at
546-47.
32 See, e.g., Tregarthen, supra note 23, at 119.
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tion with even minimal effectiveness.33 Yet, most economists and others
who advocate markets as management tools for raw water say little or
nothing about transaction costs. Economist Ronald Coase-seen by many
as the founding guru of law and economics, 34 author of the most cited law
review article published since World War II, and winner of the Nobel
Prize in Economics in 1991s-has argued that analyses that ignore such
basic concerns as are outlined in this paragraph are typical of the "black-
board economics" that he has concluded is the bane of most academic
economists.36 The most important and consistent simplifying assumption
33 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 117-18; Ujjayant Chakravorty et
al., A Spatial Model of Optimal Water Conveyance, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 25
(1995); Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393 (1990). See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 100-
01; NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 19-26 (1994); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12-14 (2d. ed. 1989); POSNER, supra note
13, at § 3.11, at 87-88; Robert Ellickson, The Case for Coase and against "Coaseanism, "
99 YALE L.J. 611, 614-16 (1989); Daniel Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh
Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 141 (1996); Harbison, supra note 26, at 544-46;
Howard Shelanski & Peter Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A
Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335 (1995).
34 See Edmund Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chi-
cago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 221 (1983) (describing how Coase won over an
extremely hostile audience at a faculty seminar at the University of Chicago in defending
the piece eventually published as The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 30); POSNER,
supra note 13, at § 2.1, at 25-26; CENTO VELANOVSKI, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTORY TEXT 18-19, 22, 46-47 (1990).
35 For more on Coase himself and the Coase Theorum, see ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 2 (1991); RICHARD POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 406 (1995); Daniel Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained. The
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 399-401 (1997); Herbert Ho-
venkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783
(1990); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 669 (1979); Daniel 0. Posin, The Error of the
Coase Theorem: Of Judges Hand and Posner and Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 629,
629-30 (1999); Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and
Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1189 n.51 (1989); Peter Passell, For a
Common-Sense Economist, a Nobel-and an Impact on the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1991, at § 4, at 2.
36 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1-20 (1988). Coase also indi-
cated that he considered the major point of his famous article was to persuade economists
to begin to take transaction costs seriously, not to assure them that markets without trans-
action costs were worth studying. Id. at 13-15, 174. Another comment perhaps best
sums up his attitude towards his fellow economists: "In my youth, it was said that what
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that most economists make is to assume a "frictionless market"-a market
without transaction costs. Lawyers, on the other hand, focus precisely on
the costs and frictions of the marketplace for their role is to minimize, ac-
commodate, or overcome such problems.37 Lawyers simply are not con-
cerned about how ideal markets could function--except as a baseline for
measuring the failures of real markets.
Another reason for treating something as a public good is because
society's values require that all receive a "fair" share of the resource, or at
least that the good not be subject to the strictures of the marketplace.38
When transaction costs make markets impossible, yet the good is per-
ceived as essential for the minimum socially acceptable well-being of all
members of the society, society (today, usually through government) un-
dertakes to provide the good to all without direct cost for the amount con-
sumed. Such goods could be termed socially created public goods. Ex-
amples of socially created public goods include fire protection or public
education, both of which are, in some settings, treated as private goods but
are generally made available to all by governments, at no direct cost to
actual consumers. The status of socially created public goods changes
through time. Thus, for most people in the United States, education for
their children is still provided as a public good, although there is a grow-
ing demand in some quarters to reprivatize education (through vouchers,
for example), although few if any analyses in these debates have used this
terminology.39 Similarly, strong efforts have been made recently to extend
a sort of common (or perhaps public) property approach to medical care.4"
was too silly to be said may be sung. In modem economics it may be put into mathe-
matics." Id. at 185. No wonder Coase has concluded that, "My point of view has not in
general commanded assent, nor has my argument, for the most part, been understood."
Id. at 1.
37 See Schwab, supra note 35, at 1188-98.
38 See generally Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 657
(1995) (asserting that legal systems reflect societies' inherent belief that certain resources
should remain outside the market); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Consti-
tutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (1995) (discussing the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine as making constitutional rights public goods).
39 For discussions about benefits, difficulties, and approaches to changing the general and
financial structures of public education, see generally CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION
(Clarence Stone ed., 1998); 1 & 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
(William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); JOHN CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS,
MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN
EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE (1988); JEFFREY HENIG, RETHINKING
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Water is just such a commodity. This is most obvious for the pro-
tection of instream flows." Less obvious, but no less true, is the public
nature of water when withdrawn for private use. While it is easy enough
for someone to own and manage water unilaterally in small amounts (for
example, bottled water), a river is an ambient resource that can never be
fully controlled or fully owned. Even building a dam only delays the flow
of the water; it cannot stop the flow altogether. Thus, doing something to
water on a large scale necessarily affects many others, making it difficult
to procure the assent of all significantly affected persons. Transaction
costs on all but the smallest streams, lakes, or aquifers, quickly become
SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR (1994); JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991); LAW AND SCHOOL
REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY (Jay P. Heubert ed.,
1999); JUDITH PEARSON, MYTHS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (1993); PRIVATIZING
EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES (Simon
Harkin et al. eds., 1994); SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE (Edith Rassell &
Richard Rothstein eds., 1993); THEODORE R. SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE
DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL (1984); VOUCHERS FOR SCHOOL CHOICE:
CHALLENGE OR OPPORTUNITY? (Marshall Berger & David Gordis eds., 1998); ARTHUR
WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1968); Robert Alley, Public Education and the Public Good, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 277 (1995); Eric Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" Might
Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 423 (1991); John Jannsen, Public School Fi-
nance, School Choice, and Equal Educational Opportunity in Texas: The Enduring Im-
portance of Background Conditions, 19 REV. LITIG. 1 (2000); Richard A. King & Judith
K. Mathers, Improving Schools through Performance-Based Accountability and Finan-
cial Rewards, 23 J. EDUC. FIN. 147 (1997); Martha Minow, Choice of Commonality:
Welfare and Schooling after the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999);
James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 429 (1999); Julie Underwood,
School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (1995);
John F. Witte, Private School Versus Public School Achievement: Are There Findings
that Should Affect the Education Choice Debate, 11 ECON. EDUC. REV. 371 (1992).
40 See, e.g., SYSTEM IN CRISIS: THE CASE FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM (Robert J. Blendon &
Jennifer N. Edwards eds., 1991); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medi-
cal Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 825 (1995); Frank
McLellan, Is Managed Care Good for What Ails You? Ruminations on Race, Age, and
Class, 44 VILL. L. REV. 227 (1999); Jonathan Oberlander, Managed Care and Medicare
Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 595 (1997).
41 See DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION:
SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997); INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN
THE WEST (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993) Michael C.
Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and Tribal Minimum
Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445 (1992).
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prohibitive unless those "spill over" effects are ignored. It is this reality
that underlies the tradition of treating water as a free good-a good avail-
able to all at no cost for the water itself, but only for the cost of capturing,
transporting, and using the water. Those who advocate recourse to private
action as the prime means for protecting instrearn values miss the point
entirely. 2
Those who advocate the privatization of water with its allocation
and management to be determined by markets are demanding an end to
our treatment of water as a free good. I agree that water should not be a
free good any longer. Economic incentives should be introduced for those
who use water so they will more realistically evaluate the social conse-
quences of their conduct. 43 I cannot stress too strongly that various eco-
42 See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 114-16; LANDRY, supra note 7; Griffin &
Hsu, supra note 7; Huffman, supra note 23; Kaiser & Binion, supra note 19, at 169-73;
Sterne, supra note 7; Thomas, supra note 7; Williams & McHugh, supra note 7. See also
Janet Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading into the Water Market: The First Five
Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 135 (1999) (describing the
problems encountered in attempting to use market transactions to secure instream flows).
43 For sources that discuss the significance of linking economic impacts to the use of re-
sources, see generally ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, supra note 11; OECD,
supra note 11; Jiirgen Backhaus, The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation:
When Should the Ecotax Kick In?, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 117 (1999); Crammond,
supra note 7; Roger Dahlstrom, Development Impact Fees: A Review of Contemporary
Techniques for Calculation, Data Collection, and Documentation, 15 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
557 (1995); D. Damania, Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Su-
pergame, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 323 (1996); Driessen, supra note 9; Don Fullerton
& Gilbert Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You
Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221 (1998); Emily
Gardner, A Victim of Its Own Success: Can User Fees Be Used to Save Hanauma Bay?, 4
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 81 (1999); Howard Gensler, The Economics of Pollution Taxes,
10 J. NAT. RESOURCES 1 (1994); Richard Horan & Marc Ribaudo, Policy Objectives and
Economic Incentives for Controlling Agricultural Sources of Nonpoint Pollution, 35 J.
AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1023 (1999); Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne Lewis
Bennett, The Cost of Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle Ar-
kansas River Valley, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445 (1998); Erin O'Hara & William Dou-
gan, Redistribution through Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the
Role of the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869 (1998); S. Renzetti, The Economics of a
Seemingly Abundant Resource: Efficient Water Pricing in Vancouver, Canada, in 4
WATER FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT 470 (Ronald D. Townsend & Donald M. Tate eds.,
1988); Roth, supra note 11; Hilary Sigman, The Effects of Waste Taxes on Waste Gen-
eration and Disposal, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 199 (1996); Olli Tahvonen, Trade
with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 1 (1996); Sherry
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nomic incentives, including fees, taxes, and "water banks," undoubtedly
are useful in managing public property. But resorting to economic incen-
tives should not obscure the fact that water remains the prime example of a
public good for which prices cannot be set in a marketplace.
The reality that good reasons exist for societies to treat water as a
public good suggests that ultimately true markets must remain marginal at
best to the management of large quantities of water for numerous diverse
users. With this in mind, it is time to consider the several attempts that
legal systems in the United States have taken to treat water other than as a
public good through the forms of common or private property. We must
turn then to an examination of how property in raw water, or in the use of
that water, is defined by law.
B. Patterns of Property in Water
The following draws heavily on the legal experience in the United
States, not just because I am most familiar with that experience but also
because that experience has been so highly varied that it can be taken as
representative of most legal approaches to water management that have
been tried around the world." In the United States, the law that defines
property in water is state law, allowing ample opportunities to try out dif-
ferent approaches to water property regimes in the United States. Thus, by
examining the forms of property in water in the United States, one will
examine the basic forms of property in water elsewhere as well. And in
this examination we shall confirm that the nature of property in water is
such that markets, real markets, simply cannot work.
The paradigm of property in the common law remains the fee sim-
ple absolute. Even today, land can be marked off and considered for most
purposes as the exclusive domain of a particular owner with little regard
for the effects of the owner's conduct on others or their property-despite
the law of nuisance and the modem law of zoning.45 Land, however, stays
put within its boundaries. Flowing water, like any ambient resource, sim-
Tippett & Craig O'Hare, Using Price to Limit Water Use: A Case Study of the City of
Santa Fe, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169 (1999).
44 For a brief survey of water law worldwide, see George Radosevich, Global Water Law
Systems and Water Control, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 20, at 39.
45 See generally ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1-3, 26-35 (2d. ed.
1993) (discussing owners' property rights).
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ply does not fit easily into such a paradigm. While considerable ink has
been consumed in devising subtly varied versions of marketable water
rights for the United States, no such scheme has ever actually been imple-
mented.46 The major changes in private property rights in water have in-
stead stressed the public nature of the resource and the limitations that
public nature impose upon private rights.4 And this in the land that prides
itself on being the international champion of free markets.4
In all the world, there are just three basic approaches to property
rights: (1) common property; (2) private property; and (3) public prop-
erty.49 The three ideal models of property each correspond rather more
46 See, e.g., TERRY ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983);
ROBERT DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (1983); JACK
HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY (1960);
SMITH, TRADING WATER, supra note 7; WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7; Arthur Chan, To
Market or Not to Market: Allocating Water Rights in New Mexico, 29 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 629 (1989); Gaffney, supra note 20; Dudley D. Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law:
Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57 Va. L. Rev. 345 (1971); Michelson,
supra note 7; O'Brien, supra note 20; Smith, Groundwater Management, supra note 7;
Tabor, supra note 20.
47 See FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., A MODEL WATER CODE (1972); THE REGULATED
RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997); Robert H. Abrams,
Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L.
REv. 1381 (1989); Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for
Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1983); Lynda Butler, Defining a Water Ethic
through a Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 439; Ronald Christaldi, Sharing the Cup: A Proposal for the Allocation of Florida's
Water Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1063 (1996); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated
Riparianism, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, at ch. 9; Jerry Fitzgerald
English, A New Approach to New Jersey's Water Supply Problems, 6 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 349 (1983); Freyfogle, supra note 20; J.W. Looney, Modification of Arkansas Water
Law: Issues and Alternatives, 38 ARK. L. REV. 221 (1984); Charles F. Wilkinson, West-
ern Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317 (1985).
48 This paradox was noted sixty years ago by one of America's most noted (and tradi-
tional) scholars of water law. See Samuel Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil,
Sea, and Seashore, 47 HARV. L. REv. 425 (1934).
49 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1968).
See generally STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); CAROL ROSE,
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP (1994); Terry Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity within the Balancing
Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53 (1998); Eric T. Freyfogle, Eight Principles
for Property Rights in the Anti-Sprawl Age, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
777 (1999); Howard Gensler, Property Law as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35
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closely than many realize to the three real world models of water law
found today in the United States. Although there has been some conver-
gence in recent years regarding state water laws in the United States, the
various states remain committed-in nearly equal numbers-to the dis-
tinctly different approaches represented by these paradigms. This equal
division is all the more remarkable given that as recently as fifty years ago
there were no representatives of the public property approach, and the
states were divided only between the common property approach and the
private property approach."
The correspondence between actual state water laws and the basic
property types was virtually judicially acknowledged in the well-known
case of Keys v. Romley,5" dealing with analogous doctrines of the law re-
garding the drainage of diffused surface water." In Keys, the defendant
built an ice rink and paved the surrounding land as a parking lot. These
and related changes produced an increase in the volume and velocity of
runoff water, producing considerable erosion on the plaintiffs downhill
residential property. The Supreme Court of California, in a carefully rea-
soned opinion by Justice Stanley Mosk, quickly reviewed and dismissed
the "common enemy rule" of surface drainage, a rule that clearly had been
WASHBURN L.J. 50 (1995); Robert Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fit-
ting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 ENVTL. AFF. 347
(1998); J.W. Harris, Private and Non-Private Property: What Is the Difference?, 111
L.Q. REv. 421 (1995); Alan Randall, Property Rights and Social Microeconomics, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 729 (1975); Jeanne Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist
Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L REv. 239 (1994); A.N. Yianno-
poulos, Common, Public and Private Things in Louisiana Civilian Tradition and Modern
Practice, 21 LA. L. REv. 697 (1960).
50 See Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 444-46.
51 See 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966). See also Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa
1976); Luther Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Walton, 296 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1956).
52 For a definition and discussions of diffused surface water law, see generally Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Related Systems of Water Rights, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 18, at § 10.03 [hereinafter Dellapenna, Related Systems]; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The
Legal Regulation of Diffused Surface Water, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 285 (1991); J.W. Loo-
ney, Diffused Surface Water in Arkansas: Is It Time for a New Rule?, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REv. 393 (1996); Adam Lenain, Comment, Toward a Universal Rule for the
Reasonable Disposition of Surface Water in California, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 637
(1995).
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rejected by California precedents." Instead, Justice Mosk focused on
choosing between the "natural servitude" rule 4 and the "reasonable use"
rule." In the course of his analysis, Justice Mosk described the natural
servitude rule as a rule of property, and the reasonable use rule as a rule of
tort," apparently as a means of reconciling two doctrines which in fact op-
erate from such divergent premises as to be irreconcilable. The court ul-
timately declined to choose unequivocally between the two rules, reaf-
firming the natural servitude rule while recognizing a duty (akin to nui-
sance) on landowners not to interfere unreasonably with the property of
others.57
Justice Mosk's observation about property and tort was more in-
sightful than perhaps he recognized.58 In writing of "property," he appar-
ently had in mind the sort of private property concept that Americans
customarily associate with the fee simple absolute. He described "prop-
erty rights" in water as a system of rights or duties regarding water which
attempts to define the rights and duties in clear and certain terms, with law
serving to protect the resulting entitlements except in so far as the owners
agree to changes through market transactions. That indeed would be a
53 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 531-32. By this rule, diffused surface water is seen as something
that all landowners need to get rid of and each landowner is entitled to do whatever is
necessary to dispose of the water regardless of its effect on adjacent landowners. The
rule is followed in about fifteen states. See generally Dellapenna, Related Systems, supra
note 52, at § 10.03(b)(1).
54 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 532-33. By this rule, lands are considered naturally burdened
with a legal duty to receive the surface drainage from uphill land so long as that drainage
is not increased or concentrated by the upper landowner. Neither landowner can alter the
land in any way that would interfere with the natural drainage pattern without liability to
the other if damage results. This rule is followed in about twenty-three states. See gen-
erally Dellapenna, Related Systems, supra note 52, at § 10.03(b)(2).
55 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 533-34. By this rule, each landowner is free to take whatever
steps he or she considers appropriate to drain diffused surface water from the land so
long as these steps do not unreasonably injure another landowner. This rule is followed
in about twelve states. See generally Dellapenna, Related Systems, supra note 52, at §
10.03(b)(3).
56 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 535-36.
57 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 536-38.
58 Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 20, at 499-508 (describing what he terms "the shift from
water rights to water wrongs" in the adjudication of water disputes).
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private property system of water allocation and management.59 The clos-
est we come to such an arrangement in American water law is the system
of appropriative rights.'
On the other hand, as Justice Mosk acknowledged, a rule which
permits anyone to use a "common pool resource" so long as the use is
"reasonable" is hardly a rule of property at all, at least in the customary
sense." The rule leaves courts to sort out conflicting claims of right to the
common resource solely through a rule of tort. This amounts to a rule of
common property, rather than a rule of private property, somewhat as if
tenants in common were to dispute the use of land.62 An even closer anal-
ogy arises in the law of the open range in some western states, particularly
when the law of adverse possession is held not to apply to common
59 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(analyzing property rights and costs by examining notions of entitlements). See also
Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931
(1985). In the context of the drainage of diffused surface waters, the common enemy
doctrine would have been a variant form of a private property rule, differing in its par-
ticulars from the natural servitude rule but not in its jurisprudential characteristics.
60 See generally WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, chs. 11-17 (giving an
overview of historical and present status of appropriative rights).
61 Keys, 412 P.2d at 535-36. Note also the American Law Institute's placement of the
law of riparian rights in the Restatement of Torts rather than the Restatement of Property.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 841-864 (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 841-
864 (1939). See also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.14,
at 3-73 (1988); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, at § 6.01(c), at 134-35.
62 See, e.g., Baird v. Moore, 141 A.2d 324 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1958); Preston v. Smith, 293
S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955); Smith v. White, 216 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1948); Reilly
v. Sageser, 467 P.2d 358 (Wash. 1970) (disputes between co-tenants of land owned in
common). See generally William E. Wheeler, Note, Adverse Possession between Ten-
ants in Common and the Rule of Presumptive Ouster, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 300
(1974) (analyzing co-tenant ousting another tenant through constructive possesssion).
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range.63 The law of riparian rights as it has evolved in the last century is a
prime example of such a legal regime in the United States.'
Justice Mosk did not consider the possibility of active public man-
agement of surface drainage. While that possibility was not in issue in
Keys, the possibility is hardly unknown in California where at least urban
surface drainage is a public responsibility and private parties are required
to "hook into" the public system and to conform to the public system's de-
cisions.65 The newest system of American law applied to the allocation of
surface water, which has been called "regulated riparianism," corresponds,
at least in theory, to a public ownership model.66
The correspondence between modem forms of American water law
and the several theoretical models of property types is more than a simple
curiosity. In light of the work done in recent years on the theory of prop-
erty, the correspondence of forms of water law to theoretical models en-
ables us to predict with some certainty whether existing forms are adapt-
able to changing circumstances, or whether an entirely new form must be
substituted when circumstances of water demand or supply change dra-
63 See, e.g., England v. Ally Ong Hing, 459 P.2d 498 (Ariz. 1969); McDonnold v. Wei-
nacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971); De Las Fuentes v. Macdonnell, 85 Tex. 132, 20
S.W. 43 (1892) (examples of cases in which court ruled adverse possession did not apply
to open range).
64 See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water under "Pure" Ri-
parian Rights, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, at ch. 7 [hereinafter Del-
lapenna, Riparian Rights].
65 See, e.g., Mehl v. People, 532 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1975). For representative decisions to
similar effect in other states, see Iowa Nat. Resources Council v. Van Zee, 158 N.W.2d
111 (Iowa 1968); Simon v. Nieses, 395 P.2d 308 (Kan. 1964); Reeder v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 392 P.2d 888 (Kan. 1964); Anntco v. Shrewsbury Bank & Trust Co.,
230 N.E.2d 795 (Mass. 1967); Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980);
Borough of Ambler v. Shepherd, 278 A.2d 886 (Pa. 1971). See generally Dellapenna,
Related Systems, supra note 52, at § 10.03(b)(5); Timothy Weston, Gone with the Wa-
ter-Drainage Rights and Storm Water Management in Pennsylvania, 22 VILL. L. REV.
901 (1977).
66 For various states' adoption and views of the public ownership model see generally
Robert Abrams, Water Allocation through Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East:
Considering a Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255 (1990); Ausness, su-
pra note 47; Peter Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Mis-
souri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429 (1982); Dellapenna, Regulated Ripariansim, supra note 47; N.
William Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System-Part
One, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 499 (1967), A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water
Pemit System-Part Two, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 23 (1968); Looney, supra note 47.
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matically.6 7 The answer seems increasingly clear that riparian rights as
known in the United States-a common property system--cannot survive.
Which system should be substituted, however, is less clear. To validate
these conclusions let us take a closer look at how common property, as a
legal concept, functions.
C. Why Common Property Systems Cannot Survive
Biologist Garrett Hardin explained more than twenty years ago, in
his famous article on The Tragedy of the Commons,6" why a common
property system can function only when the common pool resource is
available in much greater supply than the demand for the resource. When-
ever each common owner can decide for herself whether to increase her
use of the resource regardless of the effect on other common owners (ex-
cept for direct interference with the uses of the others), each owner will be
able to appropriate for herself the whole of each additional increment of
use, while the whole group will share equally the cost imposed on the
common resource. Hardin used cows grazing on a common pasture as his
example. For each additional cow I add to the herd, I obtain the full bene-
fit of the added cow, while the common owners as a group share the bur-
den of the reduced carrying capacity of the pasture. 9
Hardin has been criticized, particularly by economists, as having
over-simplified the reality of how "commons" functioned in prior times or
in remote areas. Hardin's critics have demonstrated that many such com-
mons have functioned over extended periods quite satisfactorily even
when close to the carrying capacity of the resource through informal
67 See also LUDWIK TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6-144 (1985);
Abrams, supra note 47.
68 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1268 (1968).
69 For contemporary analyses of Hardin's theory, see GLENN STEVENSON, COMMON
PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A GENERAL THEORY AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS (1991); Fred
Bosselman, Replaying the Tragedy of the Commons, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 391 (1996)
(book review); James Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 325 (1992); Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of Property Rights
and Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 633 (1992); James Walker & Roy
Gardner, Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence,
102 ECON. J. 1149 (1992). See also Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 574 (1999); James Huffman, Land Ownership and Environmental Regu-
lation, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 591 (1999).
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regulations imposed by the small communities sharing a commons.7" The
point is well taken, yet it is utterly irrelevant for describing how a "com-
mons" works in a much larger society where, because most persons are
strangers to each other, informal sanctions do not function effectively and
formal law recognizes no real limits on any one person's exploitation of
the commons.7" When the common owners are strangers to each other, as
each user receives the full incremental value of the changes he induces
while bearing only a small fraction of the costs, the only rational course
for each common owner is to increase his uses until the resource is ex-
hausted.72 This is more than a mere theoretical model. We have witnessed
it over and over again in this century regarding common pool resources
70 For examples, see CARL DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION (1980); ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
(1994); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL
RESOURCES (Bonnie McCay & James Acheson eds., 1987); Susan Jane Buck Cox, No
Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49 (1985); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard
Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 713 (1975); Sanford D. Clark, Tensions between Water Legislation and
Customary Rights, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 503 (1990); Bruce A. Larson & Daniel W.
Bromley, Property Rights, Externalities, and Resource Degradation: Locating the Trag-
edy, 33 J. DEV. ECON. 235 (1990); Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property Externalities:
Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in Traditional Grazing Context, 63 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 595 (1981); Ramzi Suleiman et al., Fixed Position and Property Rights in
Sequential Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty, 93 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 229 (1996).
71 See Harris, supra note 49; Steven Lawry, Tenure Policy toward Common Property
Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 403 (1990). On the
transition from informal to formal law, see Ronald Collins & David Skover, Paratexts,
44 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1992).
72 For attempts to describe optimal conditions under which a commons might function
successfully in more developed economic settings, see Richard Comes et al., The Com-
mons and the Optimum Number of Firms, 100 Q.J. ECON. 641 (1986); Steven Hackett et
al., The Role of Communications in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evi-
dence with Heterogeneous Appropriators, 27 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 99 (1994); Ethan
Ligon & Urvashi Narain, Government Management of Village Commons: Comparing
Two Forest Policies, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 272 (1999); Charles Mason & Owen
Phillips, Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental
Evaluation, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 148 (1997); Charles Mason et al., Expectations,
the Commons, and Optimal Group Size, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 99 (1988); Carol
Rose, Given-Ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL.
L. 1 (1994).
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when the rule of common property is not displaced by a different rule.73 In
this century, we have witnessed the tragedy of the commons, precisely as
Hardin predicted, regarding (to name just a few examples) fish in the sea,74
national park access,75 and even national treasuries.76
Hardin concluded that only a private property system, in which the
costs as well as the benefits of resource management decisions are con-
centrated on the particular owner making the decision, could avoid the
tragedy of the commons. He argued that appeals to moderation and simi-
lar forms of moral suasion could only be self-defeating; those who re-
sponded to the appeals would simply leave the field to the other common
owners who would continue to increase their own exploitation of the re-
source to the point of exhaustion. As each would realize that heeding a
moral appeal would reduce their own gains with little or no benefit to the
73 See generally MANAGING THE COMMONS (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977);
Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-so-
Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 11 (1998); Erin Clancy, Note, The Tragedy of the Global Com-
mons, 5 IND. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 601 (1998).
74 See FRANCIS CHRISTY & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES (1965); Luz Eugenia Cereceda & Guillermo Wormald, Privatization of the Sea
for Seaweed Production in Chile, 27 NATURE & RESOURCES, No. 4, at 31 (1991); Man-
jira Datta & Leonard Mirman, Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction, 37
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 233 (1999); Ronald D. Fischer & Leonard J. Mirman, The
Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT.
34 (1996); J.R. Gould, Extinction of a Fishery by Commercial Exploitation: A Note, 80 J.
POL. ECON. 1031 (1972); Patrick Nickler, A Tragedy of the Commons in Coastal Fisher-
ies: Contending Prescriptions for Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin
Tuna, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 549 (1999); Tipton, supra note 17; Katharine Marvin, Note,
Protecting Common Property Resources through the Marketplace: Individual Transfer-
able Quotas for Surf Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16 VT. L. REV. 1127 (1992).
75 See JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980).
76 See Rodney Fort & John Baden, The Federal Treasury as a Common Pool Resource
and the Development of a Predatory Bureaucracy, in BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE 9 (John Baden & Richard
Stroup eds., 1981). See also Sverre Grepperud, Population Pressure and Land Degra-
dation: The Case of Ethiopia, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 18 (1996); Peter MacAvoy,
The Great Lakes Charter: Toward a Basinwide Strategy for Managing the Great Lakes,
18 CASE-W. RES. J. INT'L L. 49 (1986); Symposium, The Law and Economics of Prop-
erty Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 521-840 (1998); Robert Wilson, Student
Article, Environmental Regulation of the Human Gene Pool as a Genetic Commons, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 833 (1996);
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common resource, even many who accept the message of the appeal would
not change their behavior.
Hardin focused on the likelihood of over-exploitation of a common
pool resource. Our experience with riparian rights suggests another fea-
ture of common pool resources. If exploitation of a common pool re-
source requires significant capital investment, the inability of potential in-
vestors to keep others from preempting an investor's uses will bring about
under-investment in the resource." This fear caused the rejection of ri-
parian rights in the drier, western states of the United States in favor of an
attempt at a sort of private property system such as Hardin would argue
was necessary less than a century later.78 Rather more puzzling is how,
given the apparent superiority of private property over common property
as a resource management system, the common property system we in the
United States now know as riparian rights came to be substituted for the
earlier private property version of that system of law.79
D. Why Private Property Systems Failfor Water Resources
While the early history of water law in the eastern United States is
not entirely clear, it appears that an earlier version of riparian rights, the
"natural flow" theory, was once followed that was as clear and certain a
system of property law as one could imagine. 0 Under the natural flow
theory, each riparian owner had an apparently unqualified right to have
water flow down undiminished in quality and unchanged in quantity ex-
77 See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656, 666-67 (Cal. 1979); J.W. Milli-
man, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J.L. & ECON. 41, 47-51
(1959); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986). For a serious challenge to this assump-
tion, see Harrison Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources,
66 NEB. L. REV. 76, 84-85 (1987).
78 See, e.g., Coffin v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882). For sources dis-
cussing early American settlements in the West and how they brought water to their
communities, see generally Robert E. Beck, Introduction and Background, in WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, at § 11.02; Corbridge, supra note 7, at 529; Joseph
W. Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra, note 18, at § 8.01;
Norman Johnson & Charles DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in
Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J.
347, 351 (1989).
79 See Dellapenna, supra note 64, at §§ 7.01, 7.02.
80 See id. at § 7.02(c).
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cept insofar as upstream uses exploited the water source for strictly do-
mestic uses.81 So long as this was the rule, each riparian could use flowing
water only to the extent that she could do so without affecting the right of
any lower riparian to the continued natural flow of the water.8 2 In the mid-
to late-nineteenth century the natural flow theory was replaced throughout
the eastern United States with the modem "reasonable use" theory,83 which
as we have noted is a common property system. Keys v. Romley, dis-
cussed above, represents a similar transition for diffused surface water;84
yet another similar transition has been underway for groundwater for some
time."
Transitions from a private property system to a common property
system are rare, to say the least. That societies have undergone, or are un-
dergoing, such transitions for water resources suggests that, despite the
asserted advantages of private property systems, such systems do not work
well for ambient resources like water. Legal historian Morton Horwitz has
described the earlier transition in the approach to riparian rights as a means
for introducing flexible development into a capital poor and technologi-
cally backward, but resource rich, nineteenth-century America. 6 That we
81 For cases pertaining to the natural flow theory, see Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472,
474 (D. R.I. 1827); Ulbricht v. Eufala Water Co., 6 So. 78 (Ala. 1889); Parker v. Griswold,
17 Conn. 288 (1845); Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241 (1827); Shamleffer v. Council Grove
Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24 (1877); Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460, 463 (1795); Clinton v.
Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 520 (1871); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 3 A. 780 (Pa. 1886).
82 See, e.g., Ulbricht v. Eufala Water Co., 6 So. 78 (Ala. 1889); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Miller, 3 A. 780 (Pa. 1886) (disputing whether the riparian user was affecting the water
rights of a lower riparian).
83 See generally Dellapenna, Riparian Rights, supra note 64, at § 7.02(d) (explaining the
reasonable use theory that is formulated upon the idea that each owner of the land may
use the water in a waterbody as long as the owner does not injure the rights of other users
of the water).
84 See generally Dellapenna, Related Systems, supra note 52, at § 10.03(b)(3) (discussing
reasonable use and drainage of surface water).
85 See, e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971) (replacing the abso-
lute ownership rule for groundwater with the reasonable use rule); State v. Michels Pipe-
line Constr. Co., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974) (same). See generally Earl Finbar Mur-
phy, Reasonable Use Rule, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, ch. 23.
86 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 33-
53 (1977). See also ROSE, supra note 49, at 163-96; Abrams, supra note 47, at 1391-
1400; Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 821, 860-98 (1995).
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are witnessing more recent transitions at least suggests that the problem is
more basic than merely a lack of cash.
Ronald Coase demonstrated, in The Problem of Social Cost,87 that
a private-property market system is the most efficient mechanism for allo-
cating resources to particular uses when it does work, but that the system
fails if there are significant barriers to the functioning of a market.88 The
87 Coase, supra note 30. On Coase's qualifications as an expert on such matters, see the
text supra notes 35-36.
88 There is a vast and still growing literature regarding the so-called "Coase theorem"-
that often what the legal rule is will be largely irrelevant to how resources are actually
used as market transactions will correct for legal mistakes. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968); Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic
Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Don L. Coursey et al., Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem:
Experimental Tests Involving Physical Discomfort, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1987);
Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972);
John J. Donohue III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce
Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549 (1989); Wayne Eastman, "Everthing's Up for
Grabs": The Coasean Story in Game-Theoretic Terms, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners' Dilemma, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 89 (1996); Robert L. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution
Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Ellickson, supra note
33; Farber, supra note 35; Farber, supra note 33; Joseph Farrell, Information and the
Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1987); Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier:
The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1987 (1996); Clifford G. Holderness, The
Assignment of Rights, Entry Effects, and the Allocation of Resources, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
181 (1989); Hovenkamp, supra note 35; Chulho Jung et al., The Coase Theorem in a
Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1996); Kelman, supra note 35; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH.
L. REV. 329 (1998); Matthew H. Kramer, A Coda to Coase, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 275
(1997); James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 597 (1989); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World. The
Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1996); Frank I. Michelman,
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Cost, 80 YALE L.J. 647
(1971); E.J. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (N.S.)
255 (1967); Francesco Parisi, The Market for Votes: Coasian Bargaining in an Arrovian
Setting, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 745 (1998); Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: If
Pigs Could Fly, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 89 (1990); Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem.
Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1994); Posin, supra note 35; Donald H.
Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcON. 427 (1972); Pierre Schlag,
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fact is that markets in water as such have never actually played much of a
role even in such a paradigmatic private property system as appropriative
rights.89 This itself constitutes evidence that markets do not work well for
ambient resources like water. Indeed, one might note that similarly mea-
ger results were realized from the effort to introduce "marketable emission
allowances" in the Clean Air Act of 199090 as a means of harnessing the
marketplace to the improvement of air quality.9
J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972); Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919; Schwab, supra
note 35; Howard Shelanski & Peter Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 335 (1995); J. Gregory Sidak,
To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991); A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reex-
amined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996); Matthew Spitzer & Elizabeth Hoffman, A Reply to
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1187 (1980) (applying the Coase theorem to baseball free agency, among
other things); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theo-
rem: Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1 (1998);
Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integra-
tion of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1998) [hereinafter Swygert &
Yanes, Unified Theory]; Symposium, Coase Theorem Symposium Part I, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 557(1973); Symposium, Coase Theorem Symposium Part 11, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1 (1974); Symposium, A Response and a Reply to Whether Pigs Can Fly,
38 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1991); Manuel A. Utset, Back to School with Coase: The Produc-
tion of Information and Modes of Knowledge within and across Academic Disciplines, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1063 (1995); Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Ani-
mal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1987); Richard Zerbe, Jr., An Integration of
Equity and Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1998). Coase seems to have responded
directly to these commentaries only once. See R.H. Coase, Law and Economics and A. W
Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1996).
89 See the authorities collected supra at note 20.
90 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(f) (1994).
91 See Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from
Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J. LAW & ECON. 19 (1995); Richard D. Gary & Michael
C. Teague, The Inclusion of Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Planning:
Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 839, 875 (1993); Paul L. Joskow & Richard
Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S.
Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 38-39 (1998); James E. Krier, Marketable Pol-
lution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 449, 454 (1994); Deborah Mostaghel, State Reac-
tions to the Trading of Emission Allowances under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 201, 223-24 (1995); Polesetsky, supra note
16, at 371; Henry van Egteren & Marian Weber, Marketable Permits, Market Power,
and Cheating, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 161 (1996); Lorna Jaynes, Comment, Emis-
sions Trading: Pollution Panacea or Environmental Injustice?, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
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The explanation for this phenomenon goes under the rather
straightforward name of "externalities"--a use by one person affects the
uses by many others, perhaps all others, and hence a significant change in
any use infringes upon the interests of many other users.92 While it might
theoretically be possible for a properly structured market to cope with all
of these concerns, 9 in any economically large or complex hydrologic sys-
tem the difficulty and expense of structuring transactions (the problem of
transaction costs)9" are a sufficient explanation of why real markets simply
REv. 207, 214-15 (1998). See also Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading
and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231 (1999); Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An International
Market for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 261 (1998) (describing global efforts for emission controls).
The failure of such systems in practice seems not to have been noticed by their
champions. See, e.g., Frank S. Arnold, SO, Trading Success Not Easily Replicable, 16
ENvTL. F., May/June 1999, at 11; Susan A. Austin, Comment, Tradable Emissions Pro-
grams: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26 ENVTL. L. 323 (1996); Bliese, supra
note 16, at 29-31; Timothy Cason & Charles Plott, EPA's New Emissions Trading
Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 133 (1996); Menz,
supra note 16. But see David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions
Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1
(1998).
92 See E.J. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 85-111 (1972); Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Posner, Prisoners, and Pragmatism, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1117 (1992); Brown &
Holahan, supra note 17; Coase, supra note 30, at 13-15; Farber, supra note 35, at 411-
12; Freyfogle, supra note 17, at 30-34; Gary & Teague, supra note 91; Arthur J. Jacob-
son, Environmental Accountability Beyond Compliance: Externalities and Accounting,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1333 (1991); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Tran-
sitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986); Jeff L. Lewin, Which Externalities Should We
Internalize? Comment on The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA
Reconsidered by Professor David Hodas, 3 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 327 (1998); Peter
M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages from Rachel Carson's Perspective: A Rite of
Spring in American Environmentalism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 381 (1996); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right,
Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979). See generally
David J. Russ, How the "Property Rights" Movement Threatens Property Values in
Florida, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (1994) (criticizing a Florida movement to pass
statute that would allow public compensation of land owners when their property is de-
valued by environmental and land use laws).
93 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at § 3.11, at 87-88 (describing externalities for water
rights).
94 See Calabresi, supra note 88.
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have never developed in practice, and do not appear likely to develop.95
Only if the law chooses to disregard all such externalities could markets
become a possibility.
Under appropriative rights, water rights are defined in terms of an
authorization to commit a specific quantity of water at a specific point at
specific times for specific uses on specific land and with a specific (time-
based) priority; the regime comes as close as one might hope to a true pri-
vate property system of water rights.96 One might expect that such exter-
nalities would be less of a problem under appropriative rights because
senior appropriators (those whose appropriations began earlier in time)
have superior rights to junior appropriators.97 Strongly enforcing temporal
priorities among water uses might lead one to expect that the law would
routinely ignore externalities in appropriative rights states when the trans-
fer is undertaken by a senior appropriator and any externalities affects only
junior appropriators. The law of appropriative rights, however, consis-
tently prohibits even a senior appropriator from changing the time, place,
or manner of use if the change would produce a significant injury to a
95 For sources on the difficulties and expense of transferring water and water rights, see
generally Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Alloca-
tion, 72 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 1184 (1990); Casey S. Funk & Amy M. Cavanaugh, Basic
Exchange 101, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 207 (1998); George Gould, Recent Develop-
ments in the Transfer of Water Rights, in WATER LAW, supra note 18, at 93; Austin
Hamre, Water Banking: Should There Be More Interest?, 25 COLo. LAW., Aug. 1997, at
97; Kaiser, supra note 7, at 246-56; McCormick, supra note 20; Miller, supra note 23;
Bill Provencher & Oscar Burt, The Externalities Associated with the Common Property
Exploitation of Groundwater, 24 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 139 (1993); Charles B. Roe,
Jr. & James R. Rasband, "Changes" to Water Rights, in THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
MANUAL 341 (R. Fink ed., 1995); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 86, at 921-25; A. Dan
Tarlock, Reallocation: It Really Is Here, in WATER LAW, supra note 18, at 104.
96 See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo.
1999) (holding that a change in the use of a decreed water right may not be used to show
historical use for a proceeding to change water rights). See generally WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, chs. 11-17 (describing the law of appropriative rights).
97 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940) (holding that so
long as any usable quantity of water will reach the senior appropriator, the junior appro-
priator must allow the water to flow past unused even though more than seventy-five
percent of the water will be lost through infiltration and evaporation before it reaches the
senior appropriator). This principle was the first aspect of the modem appropriation
doctrine to emerge. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
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junior appropriator." Generally the burden of proving that there will be no
injury to other users of water is on the one seeking to make the change,
rather than on the one objecting to the change." Thus, if the evidence is
inconclusive, a court will prohibit the change.
Precisely such uncertainty, however, is usually the case if the
question is what portion of the water diverted from the stream (the usual
measure of the appropriative right) was consumptively used by the senior
appropriator and what portion constituted a return flow to the benefit of
junior appropriators."° Indeed, placing a burden on the applicant for a
98 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)
(1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(2)(a) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
533.370(3) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23 to 72-5-25 (Mi-
chie 1978); ORE. REv. STAT. § 540.530(1) (1995 & Supp. 1999); TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 11.134(b)(3)(B) (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-3, 73-3-8(1)(b) (1998
& Supp. 2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (Michie 1999); Santa Fe Trail Ranches
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46; In re May v. United States, 756 P.2d 362
(Colo. 1988); Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988);
C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134 (Colo. 1972); Thompson v. Harvey, 519
P.2d 963 (Mont. 1974); Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M.
App. 1988); W.S. Ranch Corp. v. Kaiser Steel Co., 439 P.2d 714 (N.M. 1968); White v.
Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1979). See also SMITH, TRADING WATER,
supra note 7, at 17-26; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 5-6, 38-42, 73-
78, 189-91, 225-28, 254-57, 263-65; Anderson, supra note 18, at § 16.02(b), at 273-90;
Corbridge, supra note 7, at 507-13; Willis Ellis, Water Transfer Problems.: Law, in
WATER RESEARCH 233 (Allen Kneese & Stephen Smith eds., 1965); George Gould, Wa-
ter Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1988); Kai-
ser, supra note 7, at 213-14, 246-47; MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 29-31; Tre-
lease & Lee, supra note 20; Williams, supra note 20. See generally Naeser & Bennett,
supra note 43 (describing a dispute between Kansas and Colorado over the under-
delivery of water from an allocation agreement and the measurement of damages by
valuing the water lost).
99 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46; Weibert v.
Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1980); Crandall v. Water Res. Dep't, 626 P.2d
877 (Or. 1981); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo.
1978); Anderson, supra note 18, at § 16.02(b), at 283-84; Corbridge, supra note 7, at
530; Kevin M. O'Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited:
The Legacy of the 1987-92 Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053, 1062-74 (1994).
100 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46. For
sources on the difficult but necessary task of measuring consumptive use of water when
deciding how much a user needs, see generally J.L. MONTEITH & M.H. UNSWORTH,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHYSICS 245-63, 252 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing com-
plexities of micrometeorology and the application of this science to the accurate meas-
urement of agricultural water use); Anderson, supra note 18, at § 1602(b), at 278-85;
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change of proving a negative-that there would be "no injury" to any
other water user-often is a practical impossibility.' While we can easily
obtain exact measurements of return flows through "point sources" of dis-
charge that characterize return flows from municipalities or industries,
measuring return flows through "non-point sources"--as is characteristic
of agriculture-is far from easy and nearly always uncertain. 2 Yet it is
from agriculture that the proponents of markets seek to move water, not
the other way around. 0
3
The result of the third party rule is that a sale (or lease) of a water
right can be blocked by any affected third party-including a junior ap-
propriator-who is willing to sue for an injunction against the modifica-
tion of the water right. The consequence is that the transaction cannot take
place unless all potentially affected holders of water rights have consented.
Obtaining such consents will require contracts and compensation to be
paid to all such third parties. On even a moderately sized water source, the
costs of identifying each affected water right holder and then securing the
necessary consents will be prohibitively expensive. 4
Perhaps the classic example of what happens when a buyer seeks
water for a use that is fundamentally different or at a considerable remove
Harry F. Blaney & Wayne D. Criddle, Determining Water Requirements for Settling
Water Disputes, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29 (1964-65); Burness & Quirk, supra note 7, at
116; Corbridge, supra note 7, at 524-30; Gould, supra note 98, at 25-28.
1o' See Anderson, supra note 18, at § 16.02(b), at 283-84 [quoting CHARLES MEYERS &
RICHARD POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS 33-34 (National Water
Comm'n Law Study no. 4, 1971)].
102 The terms "point source" and "non-point source," of course, come out of the Clean
Water Act and its attempts to regulate the quality of water being discharged into a water
body. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994); 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR& WATER § 4.10 (1986).
103 See the authorities collected supra at note 19.
104 For a general discussion of transaction costs, see Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions
Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECoN. 1184 (1990);
Harbison, supra note 26, at 543-49; Howe et al., supra note 34; Avery Katz, Judicial
Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); Jay R.
Lund, Transaction Risk Versus Transaction Costs in Water Transfers, 29 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 3103 (1993); John Posnett & Todd Sandier, Transfers, Transaction
Costs and Charitable Intermediaries, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 145 (1988); Pierre
Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661 (1989). Recall here
Ronald Coase's comments on the tendency of economists to ignore transaction costs and
of lawyers to focus on them. See COASE, supra note 36, at 1-20. See also Schwab, supra
note 35, at 1188-89.
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from that of the seller is shown by the case of City and County of Denver
v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co. 0 ' The case involved the attempt of the city
of Denver to trade its sewage water for a brewery's "clear mountain
stream." Adolph Coors Co., a popular brewer in the suburbs of Denver,
was well known for the high quality of the water used in its brewing. Co-
ors, however, was unable to produce enough beer to satisfy the demand for
its product without a greatly enlarged supply of water. The city of Denver,
consistently one of the fastest growing in the United States, is always
looking for new sources of potable water for its residents and businesses.
Denver offered a swap to which Coors was all too ready to agree. Denver
would take Coors' clear mountain stream to augment its municipal sup-
plies; Coors would have the right to use unlimited quantities of Denver
sewage water for its brewery."° The transaction failed not because of
fears over possible outrage on the part of beer drinkers, but because a
group of farmers downstream from Denver (organized as the Fulton Irri-
gating Ditch Co.) obtained an injunction against this trade because it
would deprive them of the water on which they relied.' °7 The outcome in
the case is all the more remarkable as the city and Coors were contracting
regarding "imported water"-water from outside the watershed-over
which the city would have had even greater rights than if it were merely
claiming the rights of a senior appropriator."0 8 In this case, the farmers had
contractually recognized the seniority of Denver's rights over their own in
a contractual settlement of an earlier dispute in exchange for Denver's
promise to reuse any water, regardless of source, that "shall have been
once used through its municipal water system" for the benefit of the farm-
ers.0 9 The outcome in Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co. would not have de-
pended on the existence of the contract if the water had not been im-
ported."'
The law of appropriative rights does not go as far as it might in in-
hibiting transfers of water to new uses. For one thing, only the rights of
105 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972). See generally Williams, supra note 20, at 311-21.
106 See Fulton, 506 P.2d at 151.
107 See id. at 151-53.
108 See id. at 146-49.
109 See id. at 151.
110 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d at 54 n.10; Off
v. Arapaloe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo. 1988); Rooks, 495
P.2d at 1135.
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other appropriators are protected. Generalized social costs, such as the
loss of tax revenues to a community, are not protected from the effects of
transfers."' Concern over generalized social costs have generated enough
political pressure to bring about the enactment of "area-of-origin" stat-
utes."' Area-of-origin statutes have not appeared to be significant barriers
to market transactions only because the law protecting the rights of junior
appropriators provides sufficient deterrence to market transactions that it
really does not matter much whether social costs are ignored or consid-
ered.
Economists and others who champion the free play of the market
have insisted that the protection of third-party rights represents only an
III See In re Robinson, 103 P.2d 693, 696 (Idaho 1940). See also NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 42-67, 79-87, 154-58; 171-81, 204-10, 259-65; Anderson,
supra note 18, at §§ 16.02(b), 16.02(c)(1), at 281-83; Santos Gomez & Penn Loh, Com-
munities and Water Markets: A Review of the Model Water Transfer Act, 4 HASTINGS
W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 63, 69 (1996); Susanne Hoffman-Dooley, Determining
What Is in the Public Welfare in Water Appropriations and Transfers: The Intel Example,
36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103 (1996); Kaiser, supra note 7, at 219-222, 248-49; John F.
Klein-Robbenhaar, Balancing Efficiency with Equity: Determining the Public Welfare in
Surface Water Transfers from Acequia Communities, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 37 (1996);
MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 19, at 31-34, 53-54; Joseph L. Sax, Understanding
Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, I HASTINGS W-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 13, 13-16 (1994); Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 19, at
177-79, 183-85; Weber, supra note 19.
112 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 10505.5 (West 1992). For sources discussing
the development of areas-of-origin statutes made in response to water transfers, see gen-
erally LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING AREA-OF-
ORIGIN COMPENSATION (1985); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 78-79,
115-16, 225-32, 243-44, 257-59; Robert Haskell Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Ri-
parian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 591, 602-08 (1993); J. David Aiken, New
Directions in Nebraska Water Policy, 66 NEB. L. REv. 8, 58-69 (1987); Anderson, supra
note 18, at § 16.02(c)(2); Ralph W. Johnson, The Area of Origin and a Columbia River
Diversion, 46 WASH. L. REV. 245 (1971); Kaiser, supra note 7, at 215-18, 251-53; Law-
rence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in Transbasin Wa-
ter Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 527
(1986); John C. Peck, Legal Constraints on Diverting Water from Eastern Kansas to
Western Kansas, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 159 (1982); Ronald B. Robie & Russell R.
Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes-The California Experience, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 419
(1979); Gary D. Weatherford, Legal Aspects ofInterregional Water Diversion, 15 UCLA
L. REV. 1299 (1968); Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export
Legislation in California: Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657
(1994).
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overly rigid legal regime. 13 If only such requirements were removed,
markets would flourish. This mischaracterizes the situation. Area-of-
origin statutes are regulations that have the potential to interfere with or to
prevent market transactions. The protection of third-party rights operates
differently. Such protections prevent market-generated externalities from
destroying the property rights of third parties. Rather than representing
government intervention that prevents or distorts markets, such protections
are the minimum that is necessary to assure that property rights-each
person's property rights-are transferred only through markets. Judge
Richard Posner has fully described why such third-party rights must be
protected if society is to assure that water is used efficiently even while he
was attempting to justify a shift to markets as primary water management
tools:
If effects on returnflow were ignored, many water transfers
would reduce overall value. Suppose A's water right is
worth $100 to him and $125 to X, [a] municipality; but
whereas A returns one-half of the water he diverted to the
stream, where it is used by B, X will return only one-fourth
of the water it obtains from A, and at a point far below B,
where it will be appropriated by D. And suppose B would
not sell his right to A's return flow for less than $50, while
D would sell his right to the municipality's return flow for
$10. To let A sell his water right to X because it is worth
more to X than to A would be inefficient, for the total value
of the water would be less in its new uses (X and D's)-
$135-than in its present uses (A and B's)-$150.
The law deals with this problem by requiring the parties to
show that the transfer will not injure other users. In prac-
tice this means that A and X in our example, in order to
complete their transaction, would have to compensate B for
the loss of A's return flow; they would not do so; and the
113 See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
249 (1968); SMITH, TRADING WATER, supra note 7, at 24-25; Brown & DuMars, supra
note 23, at 416-18; Kaiser, supra note 7, at 214. See also the authorities collected supra
at note 23.
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transaction would fall through, as under our assumptions it
should.'14
Things could get even more complex in situations when the trans-
fer has the effect of increasing return flows."' When one factors in the
probability that much of the water one seeks to transfer was acquired
through a Federal reclamation project, the complexities become greater
Still.16 Finally, there is the problem of how to structure access to water
supply facilities if those structures are owned by yet another party not par-
ticipating in the basic transaction." 7
Once one realizes how the law affects the possibility of sales of
water rights, one readily grasps why small-scale transfers of water rights
among farmers or ranchers-all of whom are making roughly similar uses
at more or less the same place-are the only ones that regularly occurred
without state intervention."' For these small-scale, like-kind transactions,
there is little likelihood of effects on third parties. The only large-scale
transactions involving a significant change in the place or manner of use
and achieved purely by market transactions have been in situations where
the transferor was the last beneficial user of the water. The prime example
could well be the transfer of water from the Imperial Irrigation District in
southern California to the Metropolitan Water District or the San Diego
County Water Authority serving the urban conglomerates of southern
California."' In that context, if the transferred water was not conserved by
114 See POSNER, supra note 13, at § 3.11, at 88. See also Jeffrey L. Jordan, Externalities,
Water Prices, and Water Transfers, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1007 (1999).
15 See POSNER, supra note 13, at § 3.11, at 88.
116 See Anderson, supra note 18, at § 16.03; Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Pri-
vate Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
363 (1997).
117 See Timothy H. Quinn, Wheeling Provisions of the Model Water Transfer Act, 4
HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 83, 84 (1996).
118 See the authorities collected supra at note 18.
119 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 234-47; MARC REISNER &
SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER
154-62 (1990); Cordua, supra note 19, at 609-11; Michael Gheleta, Water Use Efficiency
and Appropriation in Colorado: Salvaging Incentives for Maximum Beneficial Use, 58
U. COLO. L. REV. 657, 674 (1988); Graff& Yardas, supra note 7, at 166, 168-69; Gray,
supra note 7, at 296-306; MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 37-38; Wahl, supra note
22, at 51-52. See also Jeffery Kishel, Lining the All-American Canal: Legal Problems
and Physical Solutions, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 697 (1993) (exploring the potential con-
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the irrigation district and conveyed to the water district, it would have
passed into the increasingly saline and increasingly polluted Salton Sea
which increasingly will not even sustain wildlife.12 Even so, the transac-
tions evoked strong, but unavailing resistance from local communities that
feared the ensuing fallowing of land would injure their economic base and
from other irrigation districts who contended that the salved water should
have gone to them without charge notwithstanding that they did not bene-
fit from any relevant return flow."'
Furthermore, there is another issue in addition to economic effi-
ciency that needs to be considered-namely, the distributive equity-al-
though economists often are uncomfortable discussing it.' In the nine-
teenth century, a time of limited and ineffective government, particularly
flict between the United States and Mexico over the water conserved for California, but
lost to Mexico, by the All-American Canal Project).
120 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 240; Cordua, supra note 19, at
609-10.
121 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 243-44; Cordua, supra note 19,
at 610-11; Graff& Yardas, supra note 7, at 169; Wahl, supra note 22, at 51-52.
122 See, e.g., BOULDING, supra note 23, at 306; Brown & DuMars, supra note 23, at 414-
15. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS
(Marianne Ferber & Julie Nelson eds., 1993); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pa-
reto, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and
Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2102-14, 2129-41 (1996); Jeanne Dennis, The
Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and Economics Theory, 4
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamnp, The Limits of Preference-Based
Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4 (1994); Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2229 (1996); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 88; Swygert & Yanes, Unified Theory, supra note 88. For scholars of law and eco-
nomics who argue against considering distributional equity in legal decision making, see
RICHARD LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 14-16 (9th ed. 1990); POLINSKY, supra note 33, at
7-10, 119-27; PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 590-91 (11 th ed. 1980); Robert Cooter,
Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J. LAW & SOC'Y 50 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Fred McChesney, Positive Economics and All
That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 272 (1992) (book rev.); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 487 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-
Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 131 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Reason-
ing and the Ethics of Policy, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1981, at 37; Steven Shavell, A Note
on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Eq-
uity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 414 (1981); Zerbe,
supra note 88.
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in the United States, a transition from a private property system (which
had the effect of freezing uses rather than of creating a market) to a com-
mon property system at least introduced a measure of flexibility into the
possible uses and thereby promoted social and economic development.2 3
The transition from private property to common property also, whether
intended or not, worked a massive and continuing, if haphazard, wealth
redistribution.1 24 Generally, wealth is transferred from the poorest users of
water (who hold the smallest water rights or no water right at all, and in
either case are unattractive to potential buyers) to the wealthier members
of society (those who can afford to buy water rights but need no longer
worry about compensating the small water users who lose their expected
return flows).'25 Today, the transition to a common property system seems
much less prudent as the demands for water outstrip supplies, creating a
real risk of the tragedy of the commons for those parts of the United States
that follow traditional riparian rights. 126 Given also the probably regres-
sive distributive effects on the allocation of water rights, one ought to be
wary of any such transition in today's world.
III. THE CALIFORNIA WATER BANK
California, facing a five-year long drought in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, sought to arrange the transfer of water from low valued agri-
cultural uses to higher valued urban uses. California is a dual system state
that still recognizes riparian rights to some extent even while placing
123 See HORWITZ, supra note 86, at 33-42; Abrams, supra note 47, at 1392-1396; Scott &
Coustalin, supra note 86, at 871-98.
124 See HORWITZ, supra note 86, at 33-34; Abrams, supra note 47, at 1394; Scott &
Coustalin, supra note 86, at 870-71. See generally Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market Be
Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26
ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999); Mark A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998); Symposium, A
Recipe for Effecting Institutional Change to Achieve Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 295-
465 (1995).
125 See Carl Bauer, Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal
Model in Chile, 1981-1995, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1998); K. William Easter &
Robert Heame, Water Markets and Decentralized Water Resources Management: Inter-
national Problems and Opportunities, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 9 (1995); Hendrix,
supra note 17.
126 See the text supra at notes 68-79.
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dominant emphasis on appropriative rights.'27 California therefore might
have used common property principles to divest established riparian uses
of water, having done so as recently as 1967."8 California, however, did
not attempt to enforce the common property principles already in place or
to replace its private property principles embodied in its version of appro-
priative rights with a common property system. Instead, the state set about
to create something the state and many commentators have termed a
"market" where none had existed before.'29 To accomplish this end, the
Governor of California created a "water bank" by executive order. 30 The
"bank" was later validated by legislation. 3'
One must use considerable care in discussing "water banks" for the
phrase is used in widely differing senses in the several states in which
"water banks" have been created.'32 For example, the term "ground water
127 See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979). For discussions on
the definition and development of the dual system of water rights, see generally Del-
lapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 78; Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water
Law: The Development of the California Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159
(1998).
128 See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
129 For sources regarding the results and consequences of California's creation of water
banks, see generally LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., CALIFORNIA'S 1991 DROUGHT WATER
BANK: ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN THE SELLING REGIONS (1993); RICHARD HOWITT ET AL., A
RETROSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA'S 1991 EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER BANK (1992);
Ray Coppock et al., California Water Transfers: The System and the 1991 Drought Wa-
ter Bank, in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS & LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 21 (Harold
0. Carter et al. eds., 1994); Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons from
California's Drought Water Bank, 1 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 17 (1994);
Richard Howitt, Empirical Analysis of Water Market Institutions: The 1991 California
Water Market, 16 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 357 (1993); Israel & Lund, supra note 7;
Scott A. Jercich, California's 1995 Water Bank Program: Purchasing Water Supply Op-
tions, 123 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGT. 59 (1997); Kaiser, supra note 7, at 188
n.22, 200-01; Martha Lennihan, The California Drought Emergency Water Bank: A Suc-
cessful Institutional Response to Severe Drought, in WATER LAW, supra note 18, at 127;
MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 46, 52-53; O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99;
Quinn, supra note 117, at 84; Wahl, supra note 22, at 49-50.
130 Cal. Exec. Order No. W-3-91.
'31 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1745 - 1745.11 (West Supp. 2000) (enacted 1992). On the
legislative battles over the Water Bank, see MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 47.
132 See generally LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL ET AL., WATER BANKS IN THE WEST
(1994); Kevin B. Pratt, Water Banking: A New Tool for Water Management, 23 COLO.
LAW. 595 (1994) (defining a water bank as a "mechanism for willing owners of water to
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bank" has been introduced to describe a practice of "storing" water in an
aquifer for later use.'33 This usage has little or nothing in common with
the idea of using financial incentives to facilitate the transfer of water from
one user to another.
In Arizona, the legislature enacted a "water bank" statute in 1996
that is closer to the model of a ground water bank than to other water
banks in the western states. 34 The statute created the Arizona Water Bank
Authority to collect a tax on groundwater as it is pumped for use, buying
water from the Central Arizona Project for aquifer recharge. Another pro-
vision authorizes the Authority to contract with California and Nevada for
the underground storage of Colorado River water allocated to those
states. 3 5 The Authority does not operate any facilities itself, but contracts
with the owners of existing facilities for the injection and extraction of
groundwater. 36 This "bank" operates to store water, and not to facilitate
transfers among water users. Apart from the state-operated "water bank,"
Arizona's government does not favor markets for the allocation of the
state's share of the Colorado River water. In fact, Arizona's water bank
seems more directed at preventing transfers to California than at assuring
efficient use in Arizona.1 37 As a result, the life of the Arizona Water Bank
is likely to be rather short as demand rises to a level that leaves no water to
store. 3
lease water to the 'bank' for re-lease to 'renters' on a short term basis"). Proposals to
create an interstate water bank to facilitate the marketing of water rights among the states
sharing the Colorado River have generated considerable discussion, but so far with no
significant effect apart from the Arizona legislation designed to preclude interstate mar-
keting. See David Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as
an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 573, 609-23 (1997); Maria
O'Brien, Possible Solutions: Policy Tools to Achieve Flexibility to Meet New Conditions,
Preliminary Thoughts for Coping with Future Droughts, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 175
(1999).
133 See, e.g., Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A
Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225 (1988) (describing the Kern Water Bank as a place to hold
water for its future withdrawal in dry years).
13 4 See ARz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-2401 to 45-2472 (West Supp. 1999).
135 See id. § 45-2423.
136 See id. § 45-247 1.
137 See Getches, supra note 132, at 614-15; Margaret Bushman LaBianca, Note, The Ari-
zona Water Bank and the Law of the River, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 659 (1998).
138 See LaBianca, supra note 137, at 679.
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Idaho and Texas have also created a "water bank" that follows an-
other model. 39 In both states, the legislation allows one to "deposit" one's
water right in the bank pending a need for the water, thereby avoiding the
possibility of forfeiture for nonuse."O In both states, the water bank is to
use the "deposited" water to facilitate the market transfer of the water to
other uses-in Idaho only through rental, 4' and by sale in Texas." 2 In
neither state, however, did the legislature change the rules regarding third-
party effects. 43 The Texas legislation also creates, within the water bank,
a Texas Water Trust to manage water rights deposited in the bank "dedi-
cated to environmental needs, including instream flows, water quality, fish
and wildlife habitat, or bay and estuary inflows."'" Transfers of water
rights into the Trust must be approved by the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission."' In Idaho, all water bank transactions must
be approved by the Director of the Department of Water Resources.4 6
Again, how effective any of this will be remains to be seen.'47 After all,
not one single transfer of water rights took place through the Texas water
bank in the first six years of its existence.'48
139 See IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1601 to 42-1605 (Michie 1996); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §
15.701 to 15.708 (West 2000).
140 See IDAHO CODE § 42-1764(2) (Michie 1996); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.704(a)
(West 2000).
141 See IDAHO CODE § 42-1762(2) (Michie 1996).
14 2 See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.703 (West 2000).
143 See IDAHO CODE § 42-1763 (Michie 1996); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.705 (West
2000). On the continuing Idaho restrictions on transfers, see MacDonnell & Rice, supra
note 18, at 49.
14 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.7031(a) (West 2000).
145 See id. at § 15.7031(c).
146 See IDAHO CODE § 42-1763 (Michie 1996).
147 For sources that discuss Iowa's and Texas' water bank models, see Anderson, supra
note 18, at § 16.04(c)(2); Crammond, supra note 7, at 237-38; John C. Fereday & Michael
Creamer, Swan Falls in 3-D: A New Look at the Historical, Legal and Practical Dimensions
of Idaho's Biggest Water Rights Controversy, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 573, 582-83 (1992) (evalu-
ating Idaho's water bank model); Kaiser, supra note 7, at 201-03; Kaiser & Binion, supra
note 19, at 173; MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 48-49; John R. Pitts & Janet L.
Hamilton, Texas Water Law for the New Millennium, 14 NAT. REsouRcEs & ENV'T, Sum-
mer 1999, at 37 (evaluating Texas' water bank model); Paul F. Waggoner, Now, Think of
Adaptations, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 149 (1992).
18 See Martin Hubert & Bob Bullock, Senate Bill 1, the First Big and Bold Step Toward
Meeting Texas's Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 53, 64 (1999).
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A number of states have created "water banks" that have little or
nothing to do with water as such. These states have created water banks to
acquire easements or other interests in land in order to preserve wet-
lands.'49 This sort of water bank actually is quite common because it is
necessary to secure federal funds made available under the federal Water
Bank Act enacted in 1970.15° This Act also deals only with wetlands pres-
ervation and not with water management issues.151
The California Water Bank was superficially similar to the water
banks contemplated by the Idaho and Texas legislation, but with a critical
difference. Like the institutions created by the Idaho and Texas legisla-
tion, the California Water Bank functioned purely as a means for facilitat-
ing the movement of water out of agriculture in order to serve the desires
of the far more numerous voters in northern California cities. California,
however, decided that when it buys or sells water rights it need not con-
cern itself with the effects of its transactions on third parties, even if the
affected third parties hold valid water rights.'52 No private buyer or seller
would be allowed to ignore the spill-over effects on third parties.'53
The California Water Bank itself was a rather piddling affair by
California standards, involving in its peak year (1992) some 400,000 acre-
feet when the state's shortfall alone exceeded 6,000,000 acre-feet. 54 Fur-
149 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103F.601 (West 1997).
'
5
°See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301 - 1311 (1994).
'5' See Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping
a Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 298-99 (1998). See generally Robert
E. Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation of Wetlands, 34
NAT. RESOURCES J. 781 (1994) (giving an overview of the historical and present wet-
lands policy in the United States).
152 See Gray, supra note 129, at 39-42; Lennihan, supra note 129, at 132-34; MacDon-
nell & Rice, supra note 18, at 47; O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99, at 1075; Wahl,
supra note 22, at 58-60.
153 See O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99, at 1062-74.
154 See Israel & Lund, supra note 7, at 6-12; Lennihan, supra note 129, at 131; O'Brien
& Gunning, supra note 99, at 1054. The Water Bank actually contracted to buy over
800,000 acre-feet, but took "delivery" of only about 665,000 acre-feet, and resold only
about 400,000 acre-feet to current users, "storing" the rest for future use. See HOwiTT ET
AL., supra note 129, at 10; Kaiser, supra note 7, at 189; Lennihan, supra, at 131; 0'
Brien & Gunning, supra, at 1075. The following year, it bought another 150,000 acre-
feet, most of which went into "storage." See Israel & Lund, supra note 7, at 15-19;
O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99, at 1054. See also Gomez & Loh, supra note 111, at
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thermore, the California Water Bank was a most peculiar "market." For
the 350 persons who were willing to sell water rights, the state was the
only buyer, while for the 20 institutions willing to buy water rights, the
state was the only seller. The state of California as buyer or seller had an
inestimable advantage over private buyers or sellers given its ability to dis-
regard third-party effects.
The California Water Bank's prices ($125/ac-ft. to sellers, as much
as $400/ac-ft. to buyers) can hardly be described as having resulted from
bidding in the market place.' The state chose to whom it would sell, and
set the prices by administrative fiat.'56 As a result, some seventy percent
of the water made available through the water bank went to just three ur-
ban water providers." 7 The fact that this was not really a set of market
transactions is particularly underscored when the state implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) underscored its "offers" to buy with the threat of
condemnation.
Rather than touting the California Water Bank as an example of
markets, one should describe it as state management hiding behind the fa-
cade of a market." 8 Instead of a market, the state applied economic incen-
tives to encourage private (and public) actors to comply with the state's
policy choices while disregarding the effects of the state's actions on other
private (or public) actors whose claims would preclude the accomplish-
66-67 (arguing that the potential for market transfers in California "is likely to be
small").
155 See O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99, at 1075.
156 See HowITT ET AL., supra note 129, at 5-7; Gray, supra note 129, at 21-24; MacDon-
nell & Rice, supra note 18, at 46-47; O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 99, at 1095; Wahl,
supra note 22, at 58-60. On the problem of setting water prices generally, see H. Bjorn-
lund & J. McKay, Water Markets: Buyer and Seller Perceptions, 26 WATER, Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 41; Bonnie G. Colby, Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure Water
Values?, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 617 (1987); Bonnie G. Colby et al., Water Right Trans-
actions: Market Values and Price Dispersion, 29 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1565 (1993);
Richard L. Gardner & Thomas A. Miller, Price Behavior in the Water Market of North-
eastern Colorado, 19 WATER RES. BULL. 557 (1983). On the problem of administrative
price setting generally, see Dahlstrom, supra note 43.
157 See MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 18, at 47.
158 See Gray, supra note 7, at 296-308. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Fore-
word, The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. viii (1996) (de-
scribing the California system as state regulated).
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ment of the state's goals. 59 The California water bank has had the same
effects as with the nineteenth century transition from the natural flow the-
ory of riparian rights (private property) to the reasonable use theory of ri-
parian rights (common property). Flexibility was introduced to enable
fundamental transformation of water uses within the state, and (inciden-
tally) wealth is transferred from those who formerly used water to those
who thereafter would use water."6 Specifically, the California Water
Bank transferred wealth from relatively small, poorer farmers to relatively
wealthier middle class urban dwellers. 16 1 Now, these may very well be
laudable goals in California in the late twentieth century, although consid-
erable evidence suggests that when it comes to water, if not other re-
sources, equity is more important to society than efficiency. 62 Further-
I59 See Brown & Holahan, supra note 17; Gray, supra note 7; Harris, supra note 49. See
generally the authorities collected supra at note 42. The notion of economic incentives
as a device for implementing public management is clearly demonstrated in the opera-
tions of the Orange County Water District. The District uses a combination of user fees,
taxes, and subsidies to vary the rate of use of groundwater and imported surface water in
the county. See Smith, Groundwater Management, supra note 7, at 823-42. See also
OECD, supra note 11; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: INTEGRATED POLICIEs 74-98, 184-
93 (1989).
160 See Gray, supra note 7, at 252-71; Harbison, supra note 26, at 553-59; O'Brien &
Gunning, supra note 99, at 1078-83.
161 See Gray, supra note 7, at 252-71; Gray, supra note 129; O'Brien & Gunning, supra
note 99, at 1078-83; Sax, supra note 111. See also Cereceda & Wormold, supra note 74,
at 33-37; Mark Drakeford, Water Regulation and Pre-Payment Meters, 25 J. LAW &
Soc'Y 588 (1998); Harbison, supra note 26, at 553-59; Hendrix, supra note 17; Klein-
Robbenhaar, supra note 111; O'Hara & Dougan, supra note 43; Charles K. Rowley,
Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics: A Social Choice Analysis, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 971 (1998); Mark S. Stein, Rawls on Redistribution to the Dis-
abled, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 997 (1998); Mark Honhart, Note, Carrots for Conserva-
tion: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute Offers Incentives to Invest in Efficiency, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 827 (1995). Champions of the water bank tend to make light of these
and other problems. See, e.g., David J. Guy, A Model Water Transfer Actfor California:
An Agricultural Perspective, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 75, 77 n.24(1996) (praising the California water bank system).
162 See Victor Brajer & Wade Martin, Allocating a "Scarce" Resource, Water in the
West: More Market-Like Incentives Can Extend Supply, but Constraints Demand Equita-
ble Policies, 48 AM. J. ECON. & SOC'Y 259 (1989); Dunning, supra note 77; Getches,
supra note 132, at 590-607; Hamre, supra note 95, at 99-100; Charles Howe, Water Re-
source Planning in a Federation of States: Equity versus Efficiency, 36 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 29 (1996); Helen Ingram et al., Replacing Confusion with Equity: Alternatives for
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more, the means used to achieve these goals did not involve the function-
ing of a true market-and hardly had anything to do with private property
rights in water either.'63
IV. THE PUBLIC PROPERTY OPTION
Unlike the nineteenth century, when the eastern and western states
moved in very different directions to escape the strictures of the "natural
flow" version of riparian rights,'64 both eastern and western states today
increasingly are turning to active public management for surface water ex-
ploitation, 61 surface drainage, 66 and groundwater. 67  The states of the
United States that have adopted a public property approach for water man-
agement have either determined that, despite the considerable difficulties
in defining appropriate public goals or in making the right decisions to
achieve those goals, 168 a transition to public property appears to offer sig-
nificant advantages over both common property and private property in
terms of efficient allocation of the resource and in terms of distributive
justice.!69 Such a judgment is plausible whether measured in terms of eco-
nomic values or in terms of noneconomic values.
Water Policy in the Colorado River Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER:
MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NExT CENTURY 177 (Gary Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds.,
1986); Klein-Robbenhaar, supra note 111.
163 See Gray, supra note 7, at 296-308. See generally Brown & Holahan, supra note 17.
164 See the text supra at notes 80-85. See also Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 78,
at § 8.02.
165 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47.
166 See Dellapenna, Related Systems, supra note 52, at § 10.03(b)(5).
167 See Earl Finbar Murphy, Groundwater Law and the Appropriative Doctrine, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, at § 24.02(a)(1).
168 See generally Daniel Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (1989); David Freeman, A Social Well-Being Framework for
Assessing Resource Management Alternatives, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE, supra
note 20, at 153; Jeffrey Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1986); Jerry Mashaw, The Economics of
Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989). For a
particularly touching example, see R. Michael M'Gonigle, The 'Economizing' of Ecol-
ogy: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 Ecology L.Q. 119 (1980).
169 See, e.g., TECLAFF, supra note 67, at 78-270; Frefoygle, supra note 20; Ingram et al.,
supra note 162. See also MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY,
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Over the past fifty years, about half of the states that formerly fol-
lowed the common property approach of riparian rights have changed to a
system of public property now coming to be called "regulated riparian-
ism.' 71 Perhaps the leading example of such a system available today is
the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code prepared by the American So-
ciety of Civil Engineers.' 7' Because these new regulatory statutes repre-
sented a coherent system distinct from the system followed under both ri-
parian rights and appropriative rights, there is not even a generally ac-
cepted name for the system. Some years back, Peter Davis suggested that
the new regulatory system should be called "non-temporal priority permit
systems.' 17' This certainly aptly describes the systems, but it is a bit too
much of a mouthful to expect people to say or write very often. Others
have simply given up trying to use a name that tells you anything about
the system, calling the system simply "Eastern permit systems."'173 I
coined the term "regulated riparianism" some years ago, 74 arguing that it
captures the two significant elements of the new approach, at the risk per-
haps of offending those who believe the words "regulate" and "riparian"
inherently contradict each other. 171
While the details of these new systems vary more highly than the
administrative systems under appropriative rights, there is a common core
to the new systems which enables us to describe the system as it appears to
be evolving. The most fundamental departure from common law riparian
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988); Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980).
170 See Abrams, supra note 66; Ausness, supra note 47; Davis, supra note 66; Del-
lapenna, Regulated Ripariansim, supra note 47; Hines, supra note 66; Looney, supra
note 47.
171 See REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47. See also MALONEY
ET AL., supra note 47; Dominic B. King et al., Model Water Use Act, in WATER
RESOURCES AND THE LAW 533 (U. Mich. 1958).
172 See Peter Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 647, 697-705 (1968).
173 See, e.g., A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 22-23 (Richard Dewsnup &
Dallin Jensen eds., 1973) (discussing states' differing attempts to control and divide water
rights).
174 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Owning Surface Water in the Eastern United States, 6 PROC.
E. MIN. L. FOUND. 1-1, at 1-33 to 1-40 (Cyril A. Fox, Jr. & Patrick C. McGinley eds.,
1985).
175 See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 15, at 211-13 (arguing the contradictions in the term
regulated riparianism).
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rights in regulated riparian statutes is the requirement that, with few ex-
ceptions, water cannot legally be withdrawn from a water source except
pursuant to a permit issued by the state in which the withdrawal occurs.176
The permit requirement, the "regulated" part of "regulated riparianism,"
has been upheld against constitutional challenge based upon a state's
power to regulate water withdrawal and use in order to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare.'77 The rights of water users are determined by
the permits, not by the riparian nature of a use. The "riparian" element
comes from the criterion by which permit applications are judged, namely
whether the proposed use is "reasonable." ' Some states substitute terms
such as "beneficial," or "reasonable-beneficial," or "equitable" for the
term "reasonable."' 79 The factors considered in determining whether a
particular use is reasonable under such statutes are virtually identical with
the factors considered under the discredited reasonable use theory of tradi-
tional riparian rights.8 Nonetheless, the criterion of "reasonable use" is
applied very differently than at common law. An administering agency
decides before a use begins whether a use is reasonable, both in terms of
general social policy and in terms of the effects of the proposed use on
other permitted uses.' 8'
If the decision-making process were to continue to be a crisis-
response process that comes into play only after significant interference
arises between competing uses, the regulated riparian statutes could be in-
dicted for the same faults that have bedeviled common law riparian
rights.8 2 The regulated riparian statutes, however, all provide a process
whereby the decision whether a proposed use is reasonable is made before
176 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(a); REGULATED
RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at § 6R- 1-01.
177 See Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1979); Crookston
Cattle Co. v. Minnesota Dep't Nat. Resources, 300 N.W.2d 769 (1981). See generally
Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.04 (discussing various consti-
tutional challenges to states' powers to regulate water).
178 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(b); REGULATED
RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at §§ 2R-1-01, 6R-3-01.
179 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(b)(2).
180 See REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at § 6R-3-02. For
the common law approach, see Dellapenna, Riparian Rights, supra note 64, at § 7.03.
181 See REGULATED RPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at §§ 6R-2-01 to 6R-
2-08, 6R-3-02, 6R-3-05.
182 See Delapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.01, at 414-16.
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investment in the use takes place through the issuance or denial of a per-
mit. The existence of the permit process thus fundamentally transforms
the operation of the concept of "reasonableness" from that known under
traditional riparian rights.'83
Under traditional common law riparian rights, a judicial determi-
nation of whether a particular use is reasonable has always been essen-
tially relational, focusing on the relative social utility of the particular
competing uses before the court.184 While generalized interests widely dif-
fused among the public could always theoretically be included in the tra-
ditional process of judicially weighing one use against another, such inclu-
sion rarely occurred except perhaps in the form of unarticulated intui-
tions. 8 5 The administering agency is, on the other hand, composed of ex-
perts who devote their professional life, at least during their service at the
agency, to studying just such questions, if only to undertake the planning
called for in the controlling statute.'86 This knowledge, or at least any re-
sulting plans, will shape the weighing process in a manner which is at
once more abstract and more responsive to the total reality surrounding the
use of water drawn from a particular source."' Such an ambitious pro-
gram of public management might very well fall short of the goals set for
it. It might be improved by the introduction of various economic incen-
tives as part of the public management scheme. 88 But, as this article has
shown, one simply should not confuse economic incentives with markets.
Even with economic incentives, the enterprise of moving funda-
mental decisions concerning the use of water by private parties from the
actors involved into the hands of experts working in an administrative
agency poses daunting challenges to those charged with responsibility for
administering the program.'89 Novelist George Eliot perhaps best summed
183 Cf Freyfogle, supra note 20, at 499-509, 514-19.
184 See Dellapenna, Riparian Rights, supra note 64, at § 7.02(d)(2).
185 See id. at § 7.05(a).
186 See REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at §§ 4R-2-01 to 4R-
2-04; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.04(a).
'
8 7 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.05.
188 See generally the authorities collected supra at note 42.
189 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(a)(5)(D). See also
David Holtz & Monica Heitzman, Comment, "Primary Purpose" Pollution Control Tax
Incentives: Is the Public Getting What It's Paying for?, 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 401
(1996).
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up the very problem with words she put more than a century ago into the
mouth of a fictional Felix Holt:
Suppose certain men, discontented with the irrigation of a
country which depended for all its prosperity on the right
direction being given to the waters of a great river, had got
the management of the irrigation before they were quite
sure how exactly it could be altered for the better, or
whether they could command the necessary agency for such
an alteration. Those men would have a difficult and dan-
gerous business on their hands; and the more sense, feeling,
and knowledge they had, the more they would be likely to
tremble rather than to triumph. 9°
The foregoing assumes the best of the possible motives underlying
the adoption and administration of a public property system in water. It is
possible, as public choice theorists would have it, that the transition to a
public property system can be explained, however, either as a simple error
on the part of state governments (but so many?), 9' or as yet another form
of rent-seeking by those who are powerful in the government yet not pow-
erful (or at least not powerful enough) in the marketplace." If the ad-
190 GEORGE ELIOTT, 3 WORKS 37 (1867).
191 See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963);
DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 38-42 (1991); DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 384-99 (1989);
William Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and
the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948.
192 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 191; JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE (1997); FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997); MUELLER, supra note 191; PUBLIC
CHOICE THEORY (Charles Rowley ed., 1993); Jules Coleman, Afterword: The Rational
Choice Approach to Legal Rules, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (1989); B. Delworth
Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California Agriculture, in WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 7, at 83; Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 91; David Luban, Social Choice
Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521 (1996); Jonathan Macey, Public
Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L.
REv. 43 (1988); Bradford Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A
Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 445, 446-54 (1996);
Charles Rowley, The Common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and
Institutional Critique, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 355 (1989); Randal Rucker & Price Fish-
back, The Federal Reclamation Program: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior, in
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ministration of the public property system will be less than perfect (as it
certainly will, regardless of the motivations behind its introduction), we
must ask whether we should prefer it to a private property system once a
common property system becomes unworkable.
Whether the resulting permit process is superior to either tradi-
tional riparian rights, to appropriative rights, to a purely market system, or
to some other regulatory system has been, and continues to be, hotly de-
bated.'93 How one resolves these questions is largely a function of how
much confidence one has in the ability of a bureaucratic structure to man-
age a common pool resource compared to the alternatives.'94 Ronald
Coase--one of the modem gurus of market theory'g--concluded that:
WATER RIGHTS, supra, note 7, at 45; David Skeel, Public Choice and the Future of Pub-
lic-Choice-Influenced Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997); Thomas Stratmann,
The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 85 (1998); Symposium, Positive Legal Theory and Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1503-
1740 (1995); Symposium, The Puzzle of Environmental Politics, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 1-133 (1998); Theme Issue, Public Choice, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709-1012
(1998).
193 See, e.g., Robert Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36
WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1989); Abrams, supra note 66; Anderson, supra note 18, at § 16.04;
Ausness, supra note 47; Butler, supra note 47; Chinn, supra note 124; Dahlstrom, supra
note 43; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(a)(5)(D); Norman
Dudley, Water Allocations by Markets, Common Property and Capacity Sharing: Com-
parisons or Completions?, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 757 (1992); Forum, Is the Market
Working?, 13 ENVTL. F., May/June 1996, at 28; Freyfogle, supra note 20, at 510-19;
Gensler, supra note 43; Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, New Generation Environ-
mental Policy: Environmental Management and Regulatory Reform, 22 MELBOURNE U.
L. REV. 592 (1998); James Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Lais-
sez-Faire Riparianism, Market-Based Approaches, or a New Managerialism, 53 LA. L.
REV. 1779 (1993); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 88; Looney, supra note 47; O'Hara &
Dougan, supra note 43; Carol Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Com-
mon-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990); Shelanski & Klein, supra note
88; Trelease, supra note 15; Michelle Walsh, Achieving the Proper Balance between the
Public and Private Property Interests: Closely Tailored Legislation as a Remedy, 19
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317 (1995); Williams, supra note 26. See also
Donald J. Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in the Nine-
teenth Century, 18 W. HIST. Q. 15 (1987).
194 See, e.g., PHILIP HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); WATER QUANTITY/QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES (Ariel Di-
nar & Edna Tusek Loehman eds., 1995); Eric T. Freyfogle, Repairing the Waters of the
National Parks: Notes on a Long-Term Strategy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 815 (1997); Ellen
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[T]here is no reason to suppose that the restrictive ...
regulations, made by a fallible administration subject to
political pressures and operating without any competitive
check, will necessarily always be those which increase the
efficiency with which the economic system operates. Fur-
thermore, such general regulations which must apply to a
wide variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in
which they are clearly inappropriate.... But... there is
no reason why, on occasion, . . . governmental administra-
tive regulation should not lead to an improvement in eco-
nomic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely
when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a
large number of people are involved and in which therefore
the costs of handling the problem through the market or the
firm may be high.
All solutions have costs and there is no reason
to suppose that government regulation is called for simply
because the problem is not well handled by the market or
the firm. Satisfactory views on policy can only come from
a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms and
governments handle the problem of harmful effects.'96
One need not adopt a radical anti-economics stance such as James
Boyd White has advocated in order to agree with Coase's point that mar-
Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations and Other Rulemaking Processes: Strengths and Weak-
nessesfrom an Industry Viewpoint, 46 DUKE L.J. 1429 (1997).
195 See the text supra at notes 35-36.
196 Coase, supra note 30, at 18. See also Daniel Cole, When Is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regu-
latory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 887; Daniel Esty, To-
ward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999); Irene Henri-
ques & Perry Sadosky, The Determinants of an Environmentally Responsive Firm: An
Empirical Approach, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 381 (1996); Mank, supra note 192;
Carol Rose, Given-Ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24
ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
2000]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
kets do fail.'97 Economists who seek to reject Coase's point find them-
selves forced to introduce "invisible, indeterminate, (heaven forbid) soft
factors" to explain why actors in the market place do not behave in ways
that economic theory predicts. 9 This simply will not do. To suggest that
the sellers of strawberries, for example, who refuse to lower their price to
clear their shelves rather than see the strawberries spoil overnight have a
predilection for rotten strawberries simply does nothing but reduce eco-
nomic theory to meaningless circularity. 9 When we find that even in
such a classic setting as among Bedouin horse dealers, markets can simply
fail to reach the most economically efficient outcome" we must begin to
question when markets can be expected to achieve the most socially desir-
able outcome, even if we define "most socially desirable" in the narrowest
of economic terms. °"
In the context of water management, one cannot have much confi-
dence in a more purely market system given the scarcity of actual empiri-
cal experience with such a system and given the enormous complexities of
transaction costs and externalities present as barriers to a successful mar-
ket for water rights.2 2 As we have seen, such markets as have arisen have
done so either as minor exchanges among shareholders of "mutual ditch
companies" or through the rather heavy-handed intervention of the state.20 3
When the latter happens, it is hard to argue that the "invisible hand" of the
market place is at work, or that we are not observing in reality simply a
form of public management only moderately different from the overtly
public systems described here. And as for any hypothetically new model
beyond those considered in this article, one hardly knows where to begin.
In the eastern United States, the problem of riparian rights as
vested property rights in a mature economic system is likely, as a practical
197 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 48-85 (1990). See also BARBARA
FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST
LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); HALE, supra note 21; SAGOFF, supra note
169; Cotter, supra note 122, at 2114-29.
198 See Steven Lubet, Notes on the Bedouin Horse Trade or "Why Don't the Markets
Clear, Daddy?, " 74 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1054 (1996).
199 See id. at 1053-54.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 1053-57.
202 See the text supra at notes 80-126.
203 See the authorities collected supra at note 18, and the text supra at notes 127-63.
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matter, to preclude recourse to appropriative rights rather than regulated
riparianism.204 Because of the growing shortages of water relative to de-
mand in most eastern states, the trend towards regulated riparianism is
likely to strengthen because the system has at least three demonstrable ad-
vantages over traditional riparian rights. First, so long as water is treated
as a common pool resource, we face the "tragedy of the commons" ;205 only
active public management can avoid the utter destruction of the re-
source.216 Second, having a permit in advance of investment provides the
security of right, so lacking under common law riparian rights, necessary
for intelligent planning or investment decisions. 2 7 Finally, the emphasis
on comprehensive planning under regulated riparianism enables problems
to be dealt with more rationally by creating the possibility that a problem
will be recognized and responded to before it becomes a crisis.208
Accepting the public managerial impulse has, of course, substantial
costs, both in terms of money and in terms of the risk of poor decisions by
the managers. Monetary costs include not only the salaries and other ex-
penses of the administering agency and of any reviewing agencies, but
also the costs of applicants and permittees in complying with the numer-
ous procedures and requirements imposed by the agency. Some of these
costs can be avoided by exempting users, who consume only small quan-
tities of water or who make low-valued uses, from the administrative proc-
ess,2" but only by leaving out of the system uses that in the aggregate can
amount to a major limitation on the administrative process. Small or low-
valued uses might be included in the process with subsidies through lower
fees or complete exemptions from fees,2"0 but these users must still incur
the expenses of preparing any necessary information to apply for or to
204 See Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 78, at § 8.05(a).
205 See Dellapenna, supra note 61, at § 6.01(b); Hardin, supra note 68.
206 Consider, for example, Arizona's experience with groundwater before and after the
state introduced public management. See Murphy, supra note 167, at § 24.02(a)(1).
207 See Abrams, supra note 66, at 261-65; Dellapenna, Riparian Rights, supra note 64, at
§§ 7.02(d)(3), 7.03; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.01, at 414-
16; Freyfogle, supra note 20, at 508-10.
208 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at §§ 9.05(a), 9.05(d); Frey-
fogle, supra note 20, at 514-19.
209 See REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 47, at § 6R- 1-02; Del-
lapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at §§ 9.03(a)(1), 9.03(a)(3).
210 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 47, at § 9.03(a)(5)(C).
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comply with a permit. Furthermore, fee subsidies also only increase the
burdens of the system on those permittees who have to pay fully for their
uses or the general taxpayer who in fact funds most regulated riparian
systems.
The occurrence of poor management is more difficult to assess, in
part because there is considerable disagreement about what is the test of
good management. If one takes a purely economic approach, almost any
subsidy to a low-valued use will appear as poor management, 21' as will
any management at all if the hydrologic system generally supplies a sur-
plus to all foreseeable potential users.21 2 Yet to others, such policies will
appear to be merely the management of a major public resource in a so-
cially responsible manner, a manner that does not simply "surrender" to
the marketplace.1 3 Still, some who favor such management precisely be-
cause of a desire for social equity, as well as those who argue for eco-
nomic efficiency as the primary, if not only, criterion for social policy,
have raised serious questions about whether the experts at any adminis-
tering agency can realistically be expected to acquire the necessary infor-
mation ever to arrive at the right conclusions. 24 When one adds the unrep-
resentative nature of the bureaucratic process215 and the tendency of any
211 See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., supra note 46, at 36-37; POSNER, supra note 13, at §
3.11, at 87-88; Johnson, supra note 46, at 350-54.
212 See Abrams, supra note 66, at 264-65.
213 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 47, at 458-80; Freyfogle, supra note 20, at 514-19; Pisani,
supra note 193, at 33-37; Rose, supra note 193, at 288-96. See also Freyfogle, supra
note 25; Stein, supra note 161.
214 See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., supra note 46, at 254; Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting
to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory
Delay, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 29 (1999); Butler, supra note 47, at 452-53; Dahlstrom, supra
note 43; Gensler, supra note 43; Frank Matthews & Gabriel Nieto, Florida Water Policy:
A Twenty-Five Year Mid-Course Correction, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 365 (1998); O'Hara
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error to be enormously magnified whIen applied uniformly through a bu-
reaucratic mechanism," ' one might well wonder why the public manage-
rial impulse is so popular in eastern United States.
The question is not, however, whether a public property system
creates an ideal model of water allocation, but whether it creates a better
model for water allocation than is otherwise available." 7 The rarity of
Luke Cole, The Theory and Reality of Community-Based Environmental Decisionmak-
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markets for water rights, coupled with the deficiencies of either common
property or private property systems in water, suggests that the allocation
of water is not particularly efficient under those models either, and that the
loss, if any, from adopting public property system is not likely to be high,
and might well prove to be a gain." 8 In fact, as more than one commen-
tator has noted, the attempt to rely on private property concepts as the
primary means for managing water as a resource has resulted in freezing
uses in the pattern of their first use long after those uses have become
relatively uneconomic rather than opening up a path to relatively easy
transfer from less valuable uses to more valuable uses.219 Thus, while one
would be hard pressed to prove whether treating water as private property
or as public property was more likely to result in the economically effi-
cient use of the resource, one could easily conclude that water is one re-
source where privatization and markets are not likely to promote the eco-
nomically efficient use of the resource. Furthermore, one should take into
account that the United States already has the most unequal distribution of
income of any industrialized nation in the world.22°
The problem of using water management to further social justice
while preventing too much power from accumulating in the hands of an
unelected elite is, of course, part of the central political problem of our
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time in the face of increasingly administrative states.221 Like the problem
of efficiency, there is no easy or certain means of resolving the problem.
An active legislative involvement which provides considerable concrete
guidance would provide a partial solution.222 Such an approach, however,
perhaps increases the chances of what the public choice theorists have
warned of: Manipulation of the legislative process to enable particular so-
cial groups to capture rents for themselves. 2  Furthermore, progress
through legislative involvement depends on a rather unlikely outbreak of
political courage as well as near omniscience on the part of the legisla-
tors. 224
As this brief discussion suggests, there is no clear answer to
whether a public property system is worth the cost, or whether a private
property system would work better or at less cost. It all depends on how
one appraises certain ineffable questions. Perhaps at bottom, one can do
no better than rely on one's general attitude towards markets versus bu-
reaucracy generally. I would simply caution one to examine carefully
whether the actual experience of water markets really suggests that such a
system is workable; if not, one is left with little else than to attempt to
make a public property system work effectively and equitably, in part
through recourse to economic incentives and in part through administra-
tive command.
221 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for
Political Change: The Choice between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition,
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